Germanyís European Diplomacy: Shaping the regional milieu.  By Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson.  Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2000.  Pp.vii+148. (paperback).  ISBN 0-7190-5855-4.  German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia.  By Daniele Conversi.  The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 1998.  Pp. 81.  ISSN 1078-5639.  Poland and Germany , 1989-1991: The Role of Economic Factors in Foreign Policy.  By Randall E. Newnham. .  The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2000.  Pp. 96. ISSN 1078-5639

These three volumes share a common theme, in as much that they deal with aspects of Germanyís European policy.  Even today, for some, Germany can do little right, especially when it comes to European policy.  Whenever German politicians launch unilateral initiatives they run the risk of in some way seeking to establish German pre-eminence, as Joshcka Fischer discovered in the summer of 2000.  As debates over Kosovo demonstrated, German politicians and the wider general are equally castigated when Germany is perceived as not pulling its weight.  The reasons for this on going state of affairs, are of course to be found within the annals of twentieth-century history, and the inability of some to move beyond the negative picture of Germany created as a result of the barbarity of the Nazi regime in particular.  The fact that this regime collapsed fifty-five years ago, and that modern Germany exhibits few of the characteristics that gave rise to totalitarian rule is, it seems, immaterial to a Germanophobe rump.  It is difficult to gauge the extent of this anti-German prejudice.  It waxes and wanes among Germanyís European partners, according to, as much as anything else, the international football fixture list.

 It is indeed curious that these attitudes are most pervasive in those countries, which either managed successfully to resist the Nazis, e.g. the United Kingdom, or where in comparative terms occupation was relatively mild, such as the Netherlands and France.  Although comparisons may well be odious, as Randall Newman points out in his sparkling monograph, Polish-German relations have undergone a radical transformation in recent years.  An account of the depths to which they plunged between 1939 and 1949 is beyond the scope of this article.  Suffice it to say that by 1949 there was little love lost between the two, and no obvious chance of reconciliation.  Yet, as Newman shows a remarkable transformation has taken place in recent years, at both mass and more especially elite level.  He charts the progress of this transformation, and unlike some that commentate on this field, is refreshingly accurate both in terms of fact and rationale.  Thus the importance of the Oder-Neisse border to the wider population of Germany by the 1980s is assessed correctly, and due weight is given to the ever-declining importance of the Landsmannschaften in Germany.  For those new to the field, since 1970 (West) Germany has pursued a policy toward Poland, which has been aimed at promoting reconciliation, internal change and the growth of a west European orientation.  In return successive Polish governments first reduced and then ceased their anti-German invective, facilitated the emigration of ethnic Germans to Germany, and from the late 1980s accorded the German minority official recognition.  The net result has been a reduction of negative stereotyping on either side of the border.  Germany has also become Polandís main trading partner, as well as de facto ambassador and prime lobbyist in Brussels.  As Newman points out due to the economic disparity that exists between the two sides, the relationship between them is asymmetrical.  The interesting point is that despite this asymmetry, both sides have overcome the legacy of war and territorial dispute and have developed a working relationship, which as long as the European Union (EU) decides eventually to admit Poland shows every sign of becoming a genuine partnership.  The wider lesson to be drawn from the Polish-German rapprochement is this: if Poles and Germans can now view one another as normal people, it is about time that others grew up.

 Poland may or may not be on the cusp of entry to the EU.  Serbia/Yugoslavia is however a state that has absolutely no prospects whatsoever in the foreseeable future of becoming a member of the EU.  Interestingly enough, the mind-set of large sections of the Serb population is reminiscent of that which seemed to grip large numbers of Germans in the wake of defeat in World War One.  In other words a mythology of perpetual victimhood has been carefully nurtured and found widespread popular acceptance.  These ìvictimsî are then presented in their own media, and present themselves to the outside world as the last warrior defenders of civilisation engaged in a life and death struggle with various barbarian hordes, against whom the end justifies the means.  As ìvictimsî the Serbs are merely defending themselves against aggression from neighbouring Moslems and Catholics, who are in turn the dupes of the latest great Turkish-German conspiracy to recreate former imperial splendour.  If so many people had not died in recent years as a result of the propagation of such rubbish, the purveyors of these sentiments would deserve the derisive laughter they sometimes receive.

 However, as Daniele Conversi points out in his essay on the break up of Yugoslavia, all too often the real agenda of Slobodan Milosevic, i.e. the destruction of said country has been ignored.   Instead, Croats, Slovenes and others have been blamed for demanding exit from a state in which they had no future.  In turn the Germans have been criticised for the ìpremature recognitionî of Slovenia and Croatia, and in someway having precipitated Serb aggression, or if you prefer ìpreventive actionî, despite the fact that war had broken out prior to such recognition being granted.  Indeed such analysis, if that indeed what it is, also ignores the fact, that rather like Hitler, Milosevic recognises that ìheroicî resistance against a more powerful foe is a certain way of bolstering domestic legitimacy.  Yet, despite the fact that the Germans did not precipitate the Yugoslav wars of secession, as Conversi says, in some quarters the Germans are blamed for this mess.  I have already alluded to the factors that underline this state of mind.  The added ingredient in this case was the fact the Germany had recently recovered both its sovereignty and unity, and that France and the UK were forced to acknowledge that their remaining great power pretensions were hollow.  This in turn came as something of a shock to both countries, especially when their attempt to preserve the status quo ante was thwarted following the collapse of the peace conferences of 1991 and 1992.  Unfortunately for the defenders of the territorial status quo, the vast majority of Slovenes and Croats were more concerned with saving their necks than the faces of British and French politicians.  German recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence was incidental to the grand design of Slobodan Milosevic, and we should not forget it.

 Germanyís action in recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, marked the countryís first major unilateral diplomatic initiative since 1945.  Prior to that, (West) Germany had been content to work in the shadow of its allies and to construct its European diplomacy within a wider multilateral framework.  By European, what is meant here of course, is the European Community (EC)/EU.  .  Indeed in their volume, Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson reflect a train of thought that unconsciously substitutes Europe with the EC/EU.  Consideration of Germanyís relationship with East-Central Europe, the Balkans, and the European parts of the former Soviet Union are accorded little weight by the authors.  In fact consideration of the latter two geopolitical areas is all but absent, and analysis of the first named area is made only within the context of accession to the EU.  In other words, the title of the volume is a little misleading.  States such as Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are part and parcel of the European political landscape, even if closer association with the EU is immensely problematic and appears only on some distant horizon.

 Having said that, the authors have provided us with a detailed and erudite account of Germanyís relationship with the EU and the role that Germany has played and continues to play in the integration process.  Of interest to both to the student of the politics of the EU, and German politics, the volume is also of use to scholars of German federalism.  Through the use of thematic case studies, the authors pay careful attention to a number of important themes.  These include the way in which the Länder utilised the Maastricht accession process to claw back powers previously ceded to the Bund, and to afford themselves the opportunity establish themselves as powerful actors at both the national and supranational levels.  They do however acknowledge that the smaller, poorer and primarily eastern Länder are in no position to dictate terms, or even bargain as equals.  The authors also correctly point to the fact that given the way in which power is dispersed within a federal state such as Germany, it is sometimes difficult for outsiders to ascertain which branch of the policy-making community is responsible for which lines of policy.  Indeed, this dispersal of power actually fosters consensus politics and compromise, which in turn illustrates the extent to which governments used to operating in a more adversarial climate consistently are outmanoeuvred at supranational level.  In dealing with Germanyís major EU partnerís the authors also touch on the theme of Germanophobia that forms much of the backdrop to the monographs referred to earlier in this piece.  Although Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson are measured in their assessments, it is clear that memories of war and occupation and wariness of a united Germany, all form part of the strategic calculations made by successive French, Dutch and British governments.  The former two however, often appear to proceed in a more coherent and well-thought manner than does their British counterpart.  Thus they have extremely active in together with Germany in presenting initiatives aimed at increasing the supranational capacities of the EU, and at pooling sovereignty.  Put another way, they see any collapse of the EU as inevitably leading to a resurrection of traditional nation-state rivalries.  For that reason alone, they are happy to proceed with deepening and enlarging the EU.  Whether or not both can be achieved we are about to find out.  Given Germanyís pivotal role as a bridge between east and west, as the cases of Poland and the Balkans show, the way in which German policy-makers proceed will be of absolute importance.  Indeed, given that the wartime generation has now passed from the political stage, in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, German politicians can now be expected to articulate a more clearly defined national interest.

So once again, the British tabloid press and other shapers of public opinion will have an opportunity to resurrect old stereotypes and complain about German plots to conquer Europe by stealth.  Such public displays of deep-seated inferiority complexes are as unwarranted as they are embarrassing.  In his forthright contribution to the debate on Yugoslavia, Conversi illustrates the extent to which those who either wished to maintain the territorial status quo on occasion used Germanophobia as a cover.  He also illustrates how Milosevic not only duped several prominent British peers among others, but how he was also able to use anti-German sentiments in order to create national solidarity among ethnic Serbs.  Newnham on the other hand shows us that with goodwill such negative stereotypes can be overcome, even in the least promising of circumstances.  This is not to say that all is sweetness and light between Poland and Germany.  It is however to suggest that in the last twenty years progress has been immense.  As for the Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson volume, as you would expect detailed, careful analysis is the order of the day.  It is never the less a pity, that the proverbial visitor from Mars would on reading the book believe Europe to me much smaller continent than it really is.

Karl Cordell
University of Plymouth