This article will first try to re-shuffle such current assumption showing that a supposed domino effect can only have an impact if some specific internal factors are present. Examples of liberation movements world-wide merely serve to reinforce already pre-existing trends and do not bear immediate consequences on the likelihood of secession in far-away states. Secondly, it will hold that a demonstration effect, rather than a domino effect, indeed exists within the movements: in the historical cases analysed, the impact of the external example(s) has always been confined to the tactics and strategies eventually to be adopted by the local nationalist groups. That is, the external models are normally used by different factions within the nationalist movement in order to advance their particular ideological orientation and political praxis within the broader nationalist movement.

In order to back this hypothesis, a comparative analysis will be carried outï of the main international ideological influences exerted on two important nationalist movements in Spain, the Catalan and the Basque, through the use of both primary and secondary sources. Weï shall also occasionally refer to the independence movements in the Soviet Union. Before doing so, the most relevant theories and interpretations which attribute a key importance to 'demonstration effects' in the development of nationalism will be briefly discussed. A set of 'structural constraints' - or endogenous factors- will be finally opposed to the external influences -or exogenous factors- as alternative explanation for the success of nationalist movements. Our aim is to show that the domino effect 'theory' does not apply to nationalist movements across frontiers. Only a 'demonstration effect' is indeed possible among their proto-elites and sub-groups.

As we shall see, the term domino effect is to be intended as a sub-category of a more general demonstration effect. In our definition, domino effect refers to a movement of structural and international changes brought about by the emulation of successful independence movements. Demonstration effect refers instead to the reshaping of ideological orientation within nationalist movements across frontiers as stimulated by international events. The former concept is somewhat more restricted, insofar as it is only a particular kind of the latter with immediate implications in concrete political alignments. If demonstration is about models, domino is about facts.

The universal parable evoked by the falling dominoes is used in both social and exact sciences, where several competing metaphors can be found with slightly different meanings: chain reaction, forest fire models, avalanche dynamics, branching process, and so on. Domino effect is a concept made famous by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, in order to justify US commitment to South Vietnam in 1954, compared the nations of Southeast Asia to a row of domino: if Vietnam became red, all the states of Asia would go Communist. By the same token, the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union has apparently affected all regimes in Eastern Europe one after another much like a chain reaction, and is hence popularly viewed as a case of domino effect. One tends to forget that the Soviet bloc and its satellites represented a highly centralized system held together by an overarching ideology and, once center and ideology could not hold, the periphery would automatically loosen. Even more tricky is the attitude of those politicians who pretend to apply the same mechanism to social movements, in particular nationalist ones. Indeed, given the problems for this model to explain or predict changes at the regime level, it is at best a mirage in the case of non-institutionalized power. In other words, non-state (ethnic) nationalism is too pervasive, vague, malleable and unpredictable a force to be predicted on the simple basis of the diffusion of immanent forces.

The ghost of a domino effect is also being used by current state powers in order to curtail broader democratic opposition and ethnic dissent. This is the case not only for some Eastern European regimes, but particularly for several Third World states. There is an apparently endless list of clamp-downs on ethnic dissent by Asian states which fear a hypothetical domino effect: China's stepping up of its repression in Tibet, Burma's persistent refusal to allow democratic reforms, Indonesia's uneasiness about revelations of mass slaughter in East Timor, West Papua and Acheh, India's increasing stranglehold on Assam, Punjab, Kashmir and other restless regions, Pakistan's repression of the Sindhi minority, Sri Lanka's new offensive against Tamil separatists, Georgia's move to autocratic rule, Turkey's renewed confrontation with the Kurdish insurgence, Iran's resort to radicalism in the face of mounting tensions in its border areas, and, finally even Iraq's move to invade Kuwait as a classic case of 'externalization' of internal ethnic tensions. All these cases seem to be related to a new world-wide obsession about the inevitable break-up of multi-national states. Although the threat of ethnic secessionism is sometime present, in many other cases it appears to be only a pretext to eliminate all forms of dissent. In the case of Africa, the effect had been amplified by the Eritrean victory and the separation of northern Somaliland. The situations in Zaire, Mali or Nigeria, where thousands of people have died in ethnic clashes, are linked to the central governments fear and refusal to come to terms with ethnic demands. With the possible exception of France, Western Europe has been somewhat immune to such illiberal trends, thanks to a faith in the elasticity of federalist politics both at the level of Brussels and the single states' capitals.

The diffusionist paradigm

Various implicit theories and underlying assumptions on the diffusion of nationalism are included in scholarly research. One of these is that nationalism spreads as a joint outward and top-down process. The former refers to a centre-periphery (horizontal dimension) mechanism of diffusion, whilst the latter refers to non-reciprocal influences between elites and subsequent diffusion among the masses (vertical dimension).

Modernization theorists stressed that increased communications would erase ethnic cleavages and result in successful achievement of nation-building.In his own adaptation of the modernization theory, Walker Connor reverses the tables, considering how nationalism is a force directly linked to increasing contacts and communications: nationalism spreads as communications spread. "Though ethnic consciousness is still to be discovered by much of the world's population, it is expanding very rapidly as outside forces increasingly intrude upon the villagers' former isolationÖ The rapid spread of literacy, the greater mobility of man made possible by dramatic developments in the form and expanse of transportation, and the even more revolutionary strides in communications have rapidly dissipated the possibility of cultural isolation, and, correspondingly, have rapidly propagated national consciousnessÖ These developments not only cause the individual to become more aware of alien ethnic groups, but also of those who share his ethnicity".

On the other hand, for Kedourie the process of diffusion is carried out by a mechanism of imitation by local intellectuals and elites. Nationalism is the result of the diffusion of the modern principle of self-determination as derived by the philosophical visions of German Kantianism and Romanticism and by the political praxis of the French Revolution. Intellectuals of one country imitate intellectuals from another country and the epicentre of everything lies in the midst of Europe (France and Germany). As Smith points out, "this scheme only makes sense within Europe, or part of it, and only if we think that the primary duty of the taxonomist is to trace ideological pedigrees and ancestors". Nevertheless, the next section shall argueï that ideological diffusionism plays a role for the leaders of the nationalist movement, especially in its radical fringes: different models and conceptions of nationalism can pave the way for different evolutions of their movements.

Furthermore, communications and the new information society offer new opportunities for ethnic networks and inter-national solidarity to develop on an universal scale. "Ethnic conflict possesses elements of universality and uniformity that were not present at earlier times. The ubiquitous character of ethnic conflict opens opportunities for groups and movements to become part of a broad and respectable current, learning from each other and in so doing becoming similar in their claims and aspirations. The profusion of ethnic claims is in fact expressed in a distinctly parsimonious common rhetoric. Its terminology is the language of competition and equality, a remarkably individualistic idiom for claims that are advanced on a collective basis".

The limited impact of external 'models'

As said at the beginning, the present paper advances two sets of hypotheses:

1. The potential international consequences of the success of independence movements (domino effect) are normally overstated in political theory and practice, as well in international relations.

2. The most relevant direct influence (demonstration effect) concerns the model to be adopted by nationalist movements. However, this choice is completely subordinate to the internal (historical, political, economic, cultural, etc.) situation of the receptive nationality.

The bulk of this paper will be devoted to assessing the second statement. As for the first one, its significance has been already outlined and will be further discussed later.

There are two kinds of proved and relevant demonstration effect: 1. Instrumental; 2. Empathic.

Instrumental models are adopted as examples and inserted into both ideology and praxis of local nationalism, hence they operate at the elite level, meaning that they can orientate some of the political choices of the nationalist leaders. Empathic models refer instead to a sense of solidarity which can develop among some section of a particular 'oppressed' people and operate both at the elite and the base level thanks to their [universal] mobilizing force. Instrumental models tend to be goal-oriented and successful ones (i.e., foreign movements which achieved independence or a desired degree of autonomy), whilst empathic models arise normally when a common condition of oppression (i.e., other movements struggling in adverse conditions for 'national emancipation') is perceived across frontiers. Of course, empathy is not an exclusive monopoly of the 'oppressed': the case of the Spanish Civil War is one of the most remarkable historical examples of a world-wide movement of empathy and solidarity which translated itself in the voluntary participation of thousands of foreigners fighting on either side, but more significantly with the 'oppressed'.

This apparently contrasts with the solipsist attitude often attributed to nationalist movements. Connor rightly points out the "general insensitivity that one national group and its leadership customarily exemplify towards the rights of other groups", but adds that this is particularly the case of "dominant groups". "The peculiar emotional depth of the 'us'-'them' syndrome which is an intrinsic part of national consciousness, by bifurcating as it does all mankind into 'members of the nation' versus 'all others' appears thereby to pose a particularly severe impediment to coordinated action with any of the 'others'". It looks as if, as soon as one of such groups grab the levers of state power, it is unable to recognize any legitimacy or rationality in anti-state sentiments: "Though very sensitive to real or imagined threats to the survival and aspirations of one's own group, appreciation of this same sensitivity among other groups is apparently very difficult to project". However, as we shall see, there have been instances in which inter-nationalist cooperation has worked well, at least for a time.

Instrumental and empathic reasons are admirably fused in the case of the Baltics. Occasionally, the two models can merge in the pursuit of common interests. Examples are the Galeuzca movement in Spain (1933-1939), the Congress of European Nationalities in inter-war Europe (1925-1938), and the several Baltic agreements and common demonstrations before the achievement of independence. The first two were quite ineffective, while the latter's attempts at coordinating action have been crowned by final success. International references do not only refer to victorious liberations, as nationalist speeches and literature are often punctuated with references to other peoples struggling against assimilation and genocide.

The above distinction is necessary, since the two patterns overlap with each other. However, both the concepts of domino and demonstration effect normally refer to instrumental models that the nationalist movements try to adapt to their struggle, rather than to any solidarity. Hence, this paper will consider basically instrumental models, although a few references to inter-nationalist solidarity and practice will be necessary. At the same time, it is also necessary to put into right perspective the use of the term 'model'. When we consider all the so-called 'models' of Basque and Catalan nationalists, we see that none of them were really practicable as a model for action, since they all developed in very different environments. This fact will serve us to disprove the validity of the domino effect paradigm as applied to nationalism. At different times the Catalans and the Basques chose different examples: Crete, Norway, Finland, Alsace-Lorraine, Provence, Poland, Ireland, Hungary, Bohemia, Ruthenia, Croatia, Flanders, provided in turn the topic of numerous studies and conferences, and their struggles were regularly reported by the Catalan regionalist press.

But, if the possibility to emulate these 'models' were patently scarce or nil, what purpose did they serve? An important ideological aim in this outburst of spontaneous interest was to situate the nation in a world-wide order of interactive realities. We know that nationalists see themselves as actors in a world of nations in which each nation has its right to a separate existence and, eventually, to achieve a form of statehood. Hence, they naturally look for models that give them the possibility to be ideally included in this universal scheme (which does not mean necessarily separation). However, nations also differ in the way in which they can achieve the ultimate goal of self-determination, as the latter does not necessarily imply statehood, but can also be achieved through autonomy, sovereignty-association, or statehood within supra-national bodies. Therefore, the examples can either be non-violent demonstrations, armed insurrection, democracy, cultural revival, depending on the particular orientation prevailing in that historical moment within the movement (and according to the sub-group which makes its own).

Thus, the examples quoted in the previous paragraph were chosen at a time when Catalanism was little more than a regionalist movement. They were selected as models not for promoting separatism, but for re-shaping the existing centre-periphery relations on a federal or confederal model. In some cases, their impact was merely cultural. The Provenç al literary movement of Fé librige founded by Fré dé ric Mistral (1830-1914) was the main external source of inspiration for the Catalan cultural 'renaissance' (Renaixenç a). Yet, the Felibres did not proceed further into a fully-fledged nationalism as the successors of the Renaixenç a did. And from this exclusively cultural movement, political Catalanism arose. Hence, once it reached this stage, the movement had to select other models for its political aims. As the movement shifted again from regionalism to federalism and finally developed separatist fringes in its midst, so the external references had to change accordingly.

Thus, in the 1880s, the federalist leader Valentí Almirall (1841-1904) dreamed of an Austro-Hungarian form of dual rule as an ideal arrangement on which to shape the relationship between Catalonia and Castile. However, he stopped short of putting forwards concrete proposals in this respect. After considering a few possible foreign models (United States, Sweden, Switzerland, etc.), the final two chapters of Almirall's book propose several solutions as possible external references for legitimizing future changes in the Spanish state structure. The choice of a particular model has always been related to its attraction for some currents within the movement, rather than its concrete applicability.

The impact of Irish nationalism is an ideal case to explore the shifting 'emulation' trends affecting each movement. An 'Irish fever' emerged in Catalonia in the years 1886-7 among moderate nationalists, but the Irish example assumed a very different meaning between 1916 and 1936ï when it was taken up by radical Catalan separatists. That is, when Ireland struggled for a limited form of Home Rule, its path was extolled by the Catalan regionalists. However, when Eire achieved independence, those Catalan regionalists were displaced by their separatist rivals in the appropriation of the Irish model. This did not result in a prompt increase in the radicals' popularity, nevertheless it added legitimacy to their beliefs.

A similar evaluation occurred in Euskadi (Basque Country), whereas a different appreciation of the Irish case reflected the split between the radicals and the moderates within Basque nationalism. The Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party), founded in 1895 by Sabino Arana (1865-1903), was the first nationalist party in the Basque Country. In 1910, the moderate elements who succeeded in its direction changed its title into the more Catholic-oriented Comunió n Nacionalista Vasca (CNV, Basque Nationalist Communion). But in 1921, the radicals separated again from the mainstream CNV, in order to refound the historical PNV. At this stage, external models were determinants in both parties' subsequent political evolution, as they had to refer to different sources of external legitimation. On the one hand, the 'legalist' (=respectful of legality) CNV condemned the 1916 Easter Uprising, finding an alternative point of reference in its moderate counterpart, J. Redmond's parliamentary Nationalist Party. On the other hand, the radicals, who remained in control of the PNV, saw in the Sinn Fein as a champion to emulate. The young Aberrianos, from the name of their journal Aberri (Fatherland), who now controlled the PNV, claimed to be the true heirs of Arana's message of separation from Spain and followed with trepidation the unfolding ïof events in Ireland.

The reorganization of the PNV on radical lines after 1921 brought about another important novelty: the creation of a feminine section following the pattern of the Irish Cumann Na mBan (Irishwomen's Council). In 1922, the Irish Republican activist Ambrose V. Marteen O'Daly condensed its principles at a conference organized by the PNV in Bilbao. O'Daly emphasized women's courage and perseverance and the key role they played in the Irish struggle for independence. On the same day of the speech, a Basque feminine movement was launched by the initiative of a group of women attending the conference and subsequently named Emakume Abertzale Batza (Patriotic Womens' Association). Again, the Irish contact did not influence the spread of nationalism per se, but only its internal organization.

So far, we have seen the effect of external models on Basque and Catalan nationalisms in some crucial phases of their evolution. In the next sections we shall deal with the impact that foreign influences exerted on Basque nationalism during the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975), when Spain was practically isolated from international trends and currents.

The 'thirdworldist' wave

After the defeat of the Republican forces in the Civil War (1936-39), a long night fell on Spanish politics. But soon an impatient generation of nationalists grew up looking eagerly and ceaselessly for new international examples. This time they found them not in the Old Continent, but in the rebellious fringes of collapsing Western empires. A new 'emulative' trend of Third World liberation movements was born in Europe. In Latin countries it received the name of thirdworldism (Spanish tercermundismo, French tiers-mondisme, Italian terzomondismo, etc.).

But first we should mention another interpretation which attributes the origin of the ethnic revival of the 1960s to a number of political movements born in the United States: students' protest, civil rights and Black Power. This interpretation holds that the Black American movement of the 1960s was among the first, at least in the United States, to advance its demands in ethno-cultural terms. After it, other groups emulated the Blacks with similar demands and a wide ethnic-revivalist movement blossomed among most groups, finally reaching the 'white ethnics'. From the States, the movement expanded in other directions. In the case of Quebec, the highly popular definition of the Quebecois as negres blancs (white niggers) in the 1960s seems to offer some solidity to the claim which ascribe to the Blacks the paternity of the ethnic revival. However, there is no proven direct relationship between Black Power and the various forms of ethnic nationalism which appeared in so many distant parts of the world. Rather, both the former and the latter drank from the same sources, that is, Third World emancipation movements. What is relevant in this context is the new progressive and Left-wing language assumed by such movements, a language which took a lot from the Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity rhetoric. It ended up defining ethnic nations as 'internal colonies' in both Marxist and 'Thirdworldist' terms.

Thus, the 1960s have been chosen by many scholars as an ideal point of reference because this is the decade of the Civil Rights movement in the USA and the students' agitation of May 1968 in France. All these events of world importance, more or less inter-connected, determined the rise of a new kind of ethnic movement, much more sensitive to Marxist postulates, more aware of the mechanism of domination and exploitation, and therefore very permeable and open to the 'Leftist' language which prevailed in the 1970s. As Zirakzadeh points out, radical Basque leaders of the 1960s "were particularly fascinated by the writing of Europe's New Left theoreticians, such as André Gorz, Lelio Basso and Ernest Mandel".

Three geographical areas stand out as potential sources of inspiration for European ethnonationalist movements: the former colonial territories in the Third World, the United States, and the earlier European experience. Needless to say, the latter was largely delegitimized after World War II; thus, the ethnic movements had to look somewhere else. As for the first two areas, only the first one can stand the test of empirical evidence. We can assess this by simply going back to our double case study, emphasizing that a new Basque nationalism began to emerge in the late 1950s in the full period of decolonization. Already in 1952-3, under the full impact of Francoist dictatorship, a group of youths formed a clandestine cell in Euskadi, one of the aims of which was to discuss 'domestic' strategies in the light of recent international events. The nameless group published a newsletter called Ekin (=To do), and by this name it is normally referred to. It was the nucleus of what in 1959 was to be named ETA (Euzkadi 'ta Askatasuna), which by the 1970s, under a new leadership and generation, had launched a violent campaign of major proportions in Spain. This evolution was also consequence of a generational change. As we shall see, different generations of nationalist militants can switch to different external models.

Already in the 1940s the model for many Basque nationalists was the state of Israel, a model that the moderates of the PNV turned to again in the 1980s. Ekin's strategy and 'security norms' were directly adapted from Irgun, the Jewish national liberation movement led by Menachem Begin, since the experience of Israel was held in high respect in the 1950s. Israel was a model not only for political nationalists, but also for cultural nationalists. One of the main founders and leaders of the Ekin group, 'Txillardegi' (pseudonym of José Luis Alvarez Emparanza), extolled the revival of Hebrew as an admirable example and praised the views of Eliazar Ben Yehuda (1858-1922) about the central importance of language in the building of the Israeli nation.

The first 'security norms' outlined by Ekin recalled also the strategy and tactics of the Irish Republican leader Eamon De Valera (1882-1975) and the 1916 Easter Rising. De Valera's example was stimulating insofar as it reunited three characteristics that most Basque nationalists also upheld: separatist intransigence, cultural nationalism and a stress on Catholicism.

Yet, not all Ekin members shared the same enthusiasm for Ireland as the previous generation did. For its non-violent culturalist leaders, a leading example came from Habib Bourguiba who in 1956 achieved Tunisian independence without resorting to major violence. Ekin distributed copies of extracts from Bourguiba 's speeches, together with Menachem Begin's La Ré volte d' Israel.

It is possible to gather which were the most direct external ideological influences on the organization by looking at the short bibliography supplied in ETA's Libro Blanco (White Book) which synthesized ETA's ideas. Only one Basque source is mentioned, the other references being all works from the protagonists of successful liberation movements or analysis of their struggles, normally in their Spanish or French editions: apart from the already mentioned works of Begin and Bourguiba, we can find books on Ireland and the French partisans fighting against the Nazi occupation.

Finally, the rejection of the Irish 'failure' was total in ETA's key ideological text, Vasconia written by Federico Krutwig. Krutwig was the main inspirer of the military 'soul' of Basque nationalism, yet he was also a political and cultural nationalist. Rejecting old racialist and religious definitions of the nation, he claimed that language was the most important factor of Basque identity: Ireland now became anathema. The Irish people who "struggled as lions over the centuries for the sake of national independence, achieved their liberty only at the cost of losing their nationhood. Ireland was such a disastrous case of a people for whom freedom was useless, but for de-nationalising them even further". The author was referring to the twilight of Irish Gaelic and to the impossibility to promote it as a modern means of communication. The vision of Ireland's failure is deeply ingrained in the strong cultural emphasis adopted by Catalan nationalism, but there it often goes hand in hand with the rejection of violence.

More edifying examples were needed by the Basque radicals. The most promising ones seemed all to come from Third World countries. When ETA was born, the Algerian struggle was at its apex and renowned progressive intellectuals such as Franz Fanon (1925-1961) witnessed the atrocities perpetuated by the French troops. The conclusion of that tragic series of event is well-known, with the French withdrawing before international outrage. Franz Fanon's theory of violence as an instrument of nation-building was adopted to the Basque situation a few month after its publication in France. ETA's "theory of the cycle of action/ repression/ action" owes much to Fanon's insurrectionist model, and the Basques were soon identified as a colonized 'wretched of the earth'. In the vision of Fanon, the violence of colonialism engendered violence in the native that, when expressed, prompted government retaliation that in turn fed an escalating spiral of violence and counter-violence. The application of this theory to the Basque Country brought about a "logic of polarization" and a tragic set of self-defining bipolar oppositions.

Fanon's theory became widely known in the Basque region, largely because of its constant dissemination by ETA. The parallel between the Algerian revolution and the Basque struggle for self-determination has been quoted again and again by most ETA theorists. The Algerian experience was so relevant to the times, that a whole generation grew up in its shadow. Its impact was felt all over Europe, albeit especially in France, where most Basque exiles were living.

The experience of Algeria seemed to promise that only violence could pay off and lead the insurgents to victory. This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also determined by the internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. As predicted by Fanon, state violence was an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general 'national awareness' among the wider population, instigating them to fight back. However, at the elite level, this internal constraint came to be reinforced by international events: in the Third World, victorious nationalist movements led by revolutionary elites were restoring independence for their countries after years of bloody rebellion. Cuba, Vietnam and, to a certain extent, Maoist China, were the other unchallenged champions of this experience. Third World liberation movements exerted an enormous impact over the European youth in the 1960s at the same time as the European youth, as well as ETA, started to enter the political arena. In ETA's ranks, the evaluation of the new phenomenon was somehow contradictory: for instance, at the beginning, the leaders were unable to discern the nuances which differentiated movements such as the Israeli Irgun and the Algerian FLN. They were both seen as gallant and successful examples of armed struggle applied to national liberation. Again, in the bibliography included in another key text for ETA's military strategy, José Luis Zalbide's Insurecció n en Euskadi, the only Basque work mentioned is Krutwig's Vasconia. Most of the references are war studies or memoirs which refer to the movement of resistance against the Nazis, especially in France. There are also two books on Algeria (Jacques Duchemin and Francis Jeanson), three guerrilla classics (Che Guevara, Mao-Tse-Tung and Claude Delmas), and, finally, three 'reactionary' manuals, in order to study the strategy and tactics of the enemy (Dominique Ponchardier, Curzio Malaparte and Colonel Roger Trinquer).

External sources are selected according to the need of the movement in that particular time, hence a full explanation of these choices can only be attained through an in-depth study on the condition which brought about the emergence of a particular form of mobilization. External models are particularly needed in times of crisis: for instance, ETA's fascination with the Algerian FLN and other Third World liberation movements is an outcome of what was perceived as the United States' 'betrayal' of the Basques and their support for Franco during the Cold-War era. Likewise, in the 1960s, the choice of Marxism by some key sectors within ETA was a consequence not only of internal conditions, but also of the above mentioned international environment.

As a conclusion it is expedient to consider that 'thirdworldist' ideologies had a much more limited impact in Catalonia. Here, they have been picked up only by fringe separatist sectors which have scarcely influenced the wider nationalist movement. The pre-existing historical tradition of struggle tied, on the one side, to a 'bourgeois' type of nationalism and, on the other side, to federalist Republicanism and the progressive Left, has made the "importation" of Third World approaches irrelevant, whilst the latter have prevailed in Basque radical nationalism. Hence, this section has only addressed the Basque case.

Rebuilding the European network

Other allies for most nationalists were not successful liberation struggles which had limited possibilities of emulation, but minority nationalist movements in the very heart of the Old Continent. We have seen that the earlier European tradition of nationalism had fallen into disgrace as a result of World War II. Moreover, unlike the historical cases mentioned earlier (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.), the 'new' ethnic movements of Western Europe did not achieve independence, and their rights and autonomy are today even more restricted than in the Basque case. That is where the 'empathic' element comes in. Such alliances may appear more stringent in their constructive opportunities that any 'ideological' reference to victorious African or Asian independence movements. Indeed, Western European ethnonationalisms share more in common among themselves than in respect to most Third World movements. The reference to a united Europe as a common supra-national home for its several peoples has encouraged this trend. Hence a federalist and Europeanist trend is widespread among both radical and moderate nationalists.

But who were the forefathers of this political undercurrent of Europeanism? How was it being articulated? Jauregui mentions specifically the works of Alexandre Marc, the regionalist Yann Foué ré and, in particular, the federalist Guy Heraud. In Catalonia, two other authors exerted a considerable impact in nationalist milieux: the Occitan Robert Lafont and the Italian Sergio Salvi. They both used the definition of 'internal colonies' as applied to Europe's ethnic nations.

An important undercurrent of international contacts in this direction has been building up for decades, though it has still to yield its fruits. For instance, Catalan and Basque nationalists encouraged a moderate activity of international encounters with representatives of various stateless nations in Western Europe since at least the first decade of this century. As Pi i Sunyer explains, it "is a phenomenon of displacement and identification that leads Catalans to champion the cause of minority groups other than their own". This 'international' activity has increased over the years and is particularly directed to the youth. In turn, the situation of the stateless nations of Europe was -and is- especially followed by the youth, given its Romantic overtones and universalist appeal. Social movements such as Corsican nationalism have gained prominent attention in the radical and Leftist press of both Catalonia and Euskadi. Again, the examples followed by the radicals and the moderates were sharply different, with the former supporting international violent groups and the latter very careful to avoid any such contacts.

The original federalist component of Catalanism has evolved into a new form of Europeanism in which all ethnic regions of Europe should have their identity and culture recognized and have direct control over their internal administrative matters. In practical terms, this trend has produced interesting links, albeit theoretical for the most part, with other nationalist movements in the West, such as Sardinia, Flanders, Occitania, Wales, Scotland and, in particular, Quebec.

As we have seen, the models for Basque and Catalan nationalism have changed in time over and over again. It is important to stress that recently ETA's actions remain without external references. Increasingly, their sources of inspiration have been drying up. Most of these sources were located in Third World countries and were shared by much of the European Left. Yet, in the 1970s and 1980s, both Cuba and Algeria ceased to be a myth. The Cubans' exodus denounced the harsh conditions of life prevailing on the island under Castro, while the clamp-down on Berber activists in Kabilya struck at the very image of Algeria as a champion of liberation struggles. After the great Algerian, Cuban, and Vietnamese sagas, the Iranian revolution (which indeed had a powerful impact in some parts of the Third World) appeared hardly compatible with the secular outlook and the Marxist orientation of the Basque Left. Finally, the war resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has dealt a fatal blow to most Third World rhetoric, making anti-imperialist claims and slogans seem laughable.

Thus, ETA has lost most, if not all, of its sources of external legitimation. Of course, this is not to say that as a consequence ETA's armed actions ceased or subsided. Cases such as the Croatian civil war and the Kurdish tragedy have prompted radical spokesmen to reassert their old dictum that "the sovereignty of people is founded on blood and pain". Yet, whereas ETA has lost an international frame of reference, the democratic and moderate nationalists have gained a whole host of them after the recent upheavals in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet phase: perestroika in the West?

As with the previous occurrences, the revolt of the nationalities in the Soviet Empire (and Yugoslavia) served as a stimulus for internal debate within Basque and Catalan nationalisms, as non-violent nationalists used it as a powerful ideological tool for advancing their cause against the proponents of armed struggle. Even before independence was achieved, the peaceful struggles of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (and even Slovenia) were there to show the fallacy of those who unabatedly pursued the option of political violence. Accordingly, the bloodshed in these areas has only been a consequence of state repression and even in Yugoslavia the ensuing bloody civil war has only highlighted to the eyes of many nationalists the virtues of passive resistance.

On the walls of Spain in 1991 it was possible to see graffiti emphatically proclaiming "Euskadi = Lithuania" or "Catalonia and Lithuania, the same struggle". The imaginary Baltic 'connection' has been widely reported in the Spanish and even the international press.According to the moderate nationalists, the publicity given to the Baltics could act as a powerful deterrent against the continuation of violence. Once the Baltic case is convincingly put forward as an example of peacefully achieved independence -so the moderate argument goes-, an end to violence in Euskadi is more foreseeable, since the legitimacy of the armed option will be severely reduced. However, as we have seen, the pro-ETA factions still have 'negative' (unsuccessful, at least at the present) and violent examples, such as the Kurds and, more recently, the Croats. In the latter case, "Yugoslavia has shown the difficulty of using force to keep people together against their will". Moreover, the lack of prompt European and international support for the Slovenes, Croats, and other victims of state aggression, has provided further fuel for the radical option.

Obviously, the pressures for independence will continue to remain considerable, independent of other nations achieving independence. As we have seen, the separatist trend was already well established and strongly pursued in Euskadi long before perestroika brought into the open the plight of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Empire.

On the other hand, the most relevant 'demonstration' effect exerted by the Baltics within the Union as well as abroad, has been to set the pace for a relatively peaceful and democratic transition. It has shown other nationalist movements that independence can be achieved in an orderly way, with full recognition from the international community and, most of all, without provoking civil strife and violent confrontations between communities. Equally, the dispatch of the Soviet army to Baku in the aftermath of the Armenian pogroms at the hands of Azeri mobs has shown to other nationalist leaders that, if they do not succeed in restraining ethnic passions, the result can be the reverse of their aspirations. Ethnic strife serves as the perfect precedent for the deployment of state troops and the maintenance of the political status quo.

The two previous examples have also reinforced the position of the proponents of the inviolability of state borders who, as in the case of the dismantling of the former European colonial empires, argued for the maintenance of the original administrative boundaries (although that pattern was first broken by the fall of the Berlin wall, and then by the pan-Serbian expansionist war). According to its proponents, such a solution would bar the way to a wave of possibly endless national recriminations and territorial disputes. A glimpse of the dramatic consequences of the latter possibility has been revealed by the Yugoslav crisis. Another propaganda victory has thus been granted to the moderates, namely, their defence of the present borders of the Catalan Autonomous Community, as against pan-Catalanist aspirations. The Armenian-Azeri, Serbo-Croatian and other conflicts have shown the risks involved in any major border adjustments. Thus, the preferability of maintaining the current existing borders between the formerly Soviet republics has been translated into a further commitment to recognize the present Autonomous Communities as they stand. However, this argument is less cogent than the previous one, and many who abandoned armed struggle are not prepared to renounce their irredentist aims of reuniting in a single homeland all Catalan-speaking peoples. But, at least, they have committed themselves to _achieve that end through peaceful means.

What we wish to stress here is, in particular, that a few foreign examples, such as the Baltics, did not influence the concrete popularity of nationalism, yet they played a role in reversing the previous patterns derived from Third World movements. In some cases, the result has been to set the tone for a relative lessening of virulence in pre-existing ethnic conflicts in other regions of the world, rather than influencing their overall success. International examples do not normally have an impact on the intensity of nationalist feelings beyond limited militant circles. Somehow, they work as a tool of reinforcing the commitment of already committed individuals (converting the converted), whilst showing them different possibilities and patterns. This can clearly be seen, for instance, in the case of Catalonia, where the Baltic/ Lithuanian solution has directly contributed to the abandonment of armed struggle by the most important terrorist Catalan organization (Terra Lliure). In October 1990, its leaders publicly declared that political violence had became an obsolete weapon in order to achieve independence. In a document full of references to the Baltics and German reunification, the hardest sector of the organization decided to drop armed struggle altogether and join mainstream politics. Looking at Eastern Europe, they declared that the right of self-determination can be exercised today without fear of suffering military repression: in the present situation, "nobody will dare to send the tanks to Catalonia". It added that the revolutionary events occurring in the East heralded a new era, proclaiming with amazement: "who could dare to imagine, only one year ago, that Germany could have been reunited". This is a relevant case of an historic local choice directly influenced by an important foreign event. At the same time, the anti-Armenian pogroms of Sumgait and Baku and the ghost of a new Armenian genocide (together with other inter-ethnic clashes involving non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union) awakened public opinion to the dangers of an unchecked explosion of ethnic resentment.

The structural constraints

Talking about the structural constraints, brings us back to the question of the etiology of nationalist movements and, in particular, of their success. An abundant literature is already available on the origins and causes of nationalism. We previously mentioned the important school of theorists that seems to attribute a crucial role to external ideological forces. Many other scholars focus instead on structural or other 'internal' dimensions, be it at the state level, the economic level, the historical level, or the local-anthropological level. Many studies are also available on the causes of success of nationalist movements. However, no study has yet systematically contrasted diffusionist and structural dimensions on a comparative basis in order to explain the differential success of nationalist movements. For the purpose of this article, it will be sufficient to briefly mention those constraints which any demonstration effect must confront in order to spread beyond borders. At least three sets of constraints hamper the possible spread of nationalist waves across countries and continents:

1. Political: character and legitimacy of the state vis-à -vis peripheral nationalism(s). [The message of secession is more likely to catch on where a regime change is under way].

2. Economic: the economic interests at stake in the different regions under possible nationalist exposure and their different relations with the centre. [The message of secession is more likely to catch on where independence is more economically viable].

3. Institutional: the ready-made availability of an indigenous elite ready to assume the reins of power. [The message of secession is more likely to catch on where a pre-existing nationalist intelligentsia is ready for seizing local power, possibly with some recent previous experience].

The discussion which follows will skip the last factor since it overlaps with the preceding two. It will instead concentrate on the first of them, with a brief explanation of the second and third ones at the endï.

As for the first point, each state adopts a different policy towards its minorities. Yet, a common feature in the popular spread of nationalism is a change of regime at the centre and a lessening of its authority over the periphery. The reasons for which regime change is so important are mainly two: firstly, through change, there is a vacuum of power and the de-legitimation of the old regime is not normally followed by a prompt legitimation of the new order, unless revolutionary situations prevail. The second reason is 'psychological': "Times of transition are often times of ethnic tension. When it looks as if the shape of the polity is being settled once and for all, apprehensions are likely to grow".

There have been many waves of national fervour spreading across continents since the last century, nevertheless, only some of them have succeeded. We can see at a glance that nearly all the successful cases are clustered in some particular areas and periods. These areas were either characterized by a regime change or by deep socioeconomic transformations which tantamounted to a regime change. However, the latter are more likely to coincide with the phase of dissemination of the nationalist ideology among the masses, rather than with the moment in which nationalities achieve independence. In the past, the accession to independence of other stateless ethnies raised the hopes of many nationalist intellectuals, yet they failed to disseminate their hopes and model to the wider public, since the structural conditions were not propitious for such an 'adventure'.

In Catalonia and Euskadi, the peak of nationalist mobilization was achieved during a stage of relative nationalist dormancy for the rest of Europe. The first success of Catalanism came about in 1901 with the Lliga Regionalista sweeping the regional polls, followed in 1907 by the overwhelming victory of the coalition Solidaritat Catalana. The years from 1917 to 1919 witnessed another period of nationalist unrest with both Basque and Catalan nationalists raising their demands for more control over regional resources and a reinforcement of local institutions. The Mancomunitat de Catalunya, a semi-autonomous administrative body coordinating the activities of the four Catalan provinces, was established in 1914. These latter events coincided indeed with the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the re-foundation of the Russian Empire under the new Soviet guise and President Woodrow Wilson's rearrangement of post-war Europe. The European map was then re-drawn according to principles of self-determination, allowing the creation of new states.

Yet, in this case, a more important factor came to reinforce a pre-existing nationalist strength: Spanish neutrality during the war produced an economic boom in the two regions, where the production of steel derivatives (in Euskadi) and textile products (in Catalonia) reached boom proportions unleashing a wave of prosperity. This boom encouraged and provided the basis for an increase in the demands of local elites to run at least their own affairs, at a time when they were prevented from having a voice in the running of state affairs. Furthermore, these demands were still largely framed in regionalist terms, although the stake was now raised (more autonomy was being demanded).

Again, after the fall of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1931) and all through the Second Republic (1931-1939), a resurgence of regional nationalism occurred at a time of erstwhile massive centralization in all other European states, as exemplified by the Nazi and Fascist models. Whereas the latter were busy in their drive for cultural homogeneity and racial purification, Spain was experiencing a solitary flourishing of regional identities.

What all the four (1901, 1907-1909, 1917-1919, 1931-1939) above mentioned periods of nationalist revival share in common is that they happened in moments of weakness and lack of legitimacy of the centralist state: the Lliga's victorious electoral performances in 1901 came in the aftermath of the 1898 Cuban crisis, when Spain's loss of its last American colony (together with the Philippines) prompted an outcry among Spanish elites and intellectuals, especially in the periphery. At the time of Solidaritat Catalana (1906-7), the centre was further weakened by the crisis of the government of Antonio Maura and raising social conflicts which culminated in the Tragic Week (1909). In 1917-19, social conflicts dramatically increased with repercussions on governmental policies and a general institutional crisis. The end of the dictatorship in 1931 and the whole period of the Second Republic spelled a progressive waning of the legitimacy of the central authority through its inability to deal with both class unrest and nationalist aspirations.

What we have hitherto said can be further demonstrated by looking at what preceded and followed the demise of Francoism. Before and immediately after the death of Franco (1975), all over Spain nationalist movements erupted with an unforeseen strength, reaching their peak mobilizations two years later. True, in this case, the rebirth of Basque and Catalan nationalism was preceded and even accompanied by an European- (and Western-) wide 'ethnic revival'. But only in Spain did these movements achieve institutional changes of major proportions, sufficient to influence the political arrangements of forthcoming decades. Thanks to nationalist pressures, Spain has undergone administrative transformations unparalleled in the rest of Western Europe and which are tantamount to a revolution. Its map has been thoroughly re-drawn according to regionalist and nationalist principles, as the country was transformed from one of the most centralized regimes in the West to one of the most de-centralized ones. A quasi-federal system of 17 Autonomous Communities was established and their rights enshrined in the Constitution. Nowhere else in Western Europe were nationalist movements able to exert such effective pressures.

Hence, the so-called "international wave" of ethnic revival cannot explain the resurgence of Basque and Catalan nationalism. Rather than an imaginary demonstration effect, we can reaffirm here the primary importance of structural and historical constraints, that is, a regime change and an ongoing strong nationalist tradition. The two regions benefited much more from the pre-existing strength of nationalist elites than from the fading effect of passing international events. At the time of the regime crisis, the former were ready to seize their opportunity for power.

Conclusions

Nationalism is an historical process which was initiated by Basque and Catalan elites several decades ago and has continued to grow ever since, independently of the impact of international events. The only relevant influences that can be derived from external events encompass the means to achieve this goal of self-determination. As the argument hiterto exposed has hopefully demonstrated, what really matters is not an imaginary demonstration effect or domino reaction, but some pre-existing historical and sociological constraints. The cases shown represent different versions and visions of nationalism, rather than nationalism per se. Every new nation which achieves independence indicates a new avenue to the intelligentsia of other stateless nations that wish to achieve the same goal. But the 'internal' nationalist trend antedates the impact of the new 'external' experience. If the case of autonomy or independence would be a simple case of demonstration effect, then Galicia, the Canary Islands and other regions would have followed the lead of the Basques and the Catalans, but this has not occurred. While in most regions we can find regionalist parties, in Galicia and the Canary Islands there are groups advocating secession, but their following is relatively small.

The arguments advanced, for instance, by Horowitz are typical of the contradiction existing in the comparative literature on ethnic conflict. He first asserts that "the example of one movement cannot create separatist sentiment where it does not exist; this is not a question of contagion". Yet, he goes on arguing that "the strength of a movement, particularly one supported by external aid, can propel other separatists into action by convincing them of the plausibility of success or of consensus short of success". The fact that he adds the unnecessary variable of some external states' involvement is confusing and it suggests a lack of deeper theorizing by scholars in the field. The data provided in order to support the latter statement are essentially secondary and tertiary sources and fail to convince.

The 'structural constraints' model which is to be placed in opposition to the diffusionist one includes historical (the timing of the nationalist spread), institutional (the formation of national elites), as well as political factors (the situation of the state). This model can be applied to a whole host of -if not all- the cases of successful ethnic secession. Accordingly, the ongoing dismantling of the Soviet Empire occurred at a time of political vacuum at the centre, when the only source of legitimation for the state -Marxist ideology- collapsed.

It has been repeated ad nauseam that we live today in an interdependent world where news from one corner of the globe to the other flows with an unprecedented speed. The global village has given place to a global network in which 'tidbits of information' are selected according to the recipient's inclinations and aims. In the case of nationalist movements, these tidbits have indeed an impact, but the ideologues have to face the realities of their constituencies and adapt incoming information to their needs. As for emulation of outside models, it is almost impossible to adapt fully a foreign model to indigenous circumstances, but, as we have seen, foreign models are very relevant in influencing marginal sectors of fringe separatists, who are unmistakably the most radical and extreme in their demands, and are often committed to violence; as well as sometimes exerting a peaceful influence on these fringes.
 

* Acknowledgements.
For the research on this topic, thanks are due to the Basque Studies Program, University of Nevada, Reno, which in Summer 1991 allowed me an unique opportunity to investigate into primary sources such as pamphlets, interviews, and other documents by Basque leaders. This paper has profited from the critique of several scholars. First of all, I have to thank Paul Heywood (University of Glasgow) for his extensive comments and insights. Secondly, wish to acknowledge the perceptive contributions of George Schö pflin (LSE), Anthony D Smith (LSE), William Douglass (University of Nevada), Brendan O'Leary (LSE), Michael Hebbert (LSE), Xosé M. Nuñ ez (Istituto Universitario Europeo, Florence) and Joan-Pau Rubié s (Cambridge).

ENDNOTES

1. The term demonstration effect is used, among others, by Walker Connor 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, nº 1, 1973, p. 10; and Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) pp. 279-81.

2. Deutsch is the principal source of the modernization theory as applied to the studies of nationalism. See Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953 [2nd ed., 1966]). For a devastating critique of Deutsch's view, see Walker Connor, 'Nation-building or nation-destroying ?', World Politics, XXIV, 1972, pp. 319-355.

3. Walker Connor, 'The PoliticsÖ pp. 3-4. See also ibid., 'Nation-buildingÖ '; ibid., 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, nº 1, 1973, pp. 1-21.

4. See Ellie Kedourie, Nationalism. London: Hutchinson, 1960.

5. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 1-185. p. 31.

6. A major opponent of Kedourie's diffusionism is Gellner's (op. cit.) functionalist and quasi-evolutionist view of nationalism as a result of intrinsic material change (the advent of the industrialized state, social mobility, mass education, etc.) and as a homeostatic response to the need of industrializing societies. Kedourie' and Gellner's arguments do not necessarily contradict each other, since nationalism can be both the answer to external ideological influence and to internal structural changes. Indeed, the latter are themselves a result of a process of technological and ideological diffusion. Technological and structural changes themselves are brought about by the external spread of modernity.

7. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 5-6.

8. As part of a wider demonstration effect, the collapse of the Soviet Union and particularly the emergence of the Baltic states, has been observed elsewhere in Europe and used as an analogy by various movements demanding more access to political power.

9. Walker Connor, 'The PoliticsÖ p. 15-7.

10. Note also the wave of sympathy for the Baltic states and the rush for their recognition in Central Europe (Hungary, Poland, Rumania, etc.) and Northern Europe (Iceland and other Scandinavian countries). A common feature was, together with escaping communism in the former case, the ideal that small states should support each other (George Schö pflin, personal observation).

11. The Galeuzca organization (an acronym of the three nationalities, Galicia, Euzkadi and Catalonia) was founded in 1933 as a means to create a powerful pressure platform under the Spanish Republic. See Xosé Esté vez, De la Triple Alianza al Pacto de San Sebastiá n (1923-1930). Bilbao: Univesidad de Deusto, 1991).

12. See Xosé -Manoel Nuñ ez, 'The Congress of European Nationalities (1925-1938). Some questions'. Paper presented at the Second Conference of the ISSEI (International Society for the Study of European Ideas), 'European Nationalism: Towards 1992', The Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, 3-8 September 1990.

13. In the Basque case, but also among other nationalities, one of the greatest sources of 'empathic' identification are the Kurds. Mentions to the plight of the Kurds are pervaded by a deep sense of bitterness over the international silence which has in the past accompanied their ferocious repression (see Documentos Y, vol. 2, San Sebastian: Hordago, pp. 323-4).

14. For a comparison between Catalan and Basque nationalism, see Daniele Conversi, 'Language or race?: the choice of core values in the development of Catalan and Basque nationalism', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 13, nº 1, 1990, pp. 50-70; and Daniele Conversi, 'Political choices: language maintenance and its implications for the Catalan and Basque national movements', History of European Ideas, 1993 (in press).

15. A more restrictive interpretation assumes that the other movements' example merely functions as a 'golden mirror' in which the nationalists see themselves glorified. For instance, see Enric Ucelay da Cal, 'Politica de fuera, politica casera: una valoració n de la relació n entre nacionalistas catalanes y vascos, 1923-1936', in Manuel Tuñ on de Lara (ed.) Gernika: 50 Añ os Despues (1937-1987). Nacionalismo, Repú blica, Guerra Civil. San Sebastian: Servicio Editorial Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1987; Id., 'Castelao y Cataluñ a: semejanzas engañ osas', In J. G. Beramendi and R. Villares (eds) Actas Congreso Castelao (Santiago de Compostela, 24-29 Novembro 1986). Santiago: Universidade/ Xunta de Galicia/ Fundació n Castelao [Vol. I], 1989. In reality, what the nationalist movements need is not a mirror image but the belief in some sort of 'international' legitimacy, as well as a vague sense of direction which tells them that their strategy is not entirely wrong.

16. See Jordi Llorens i Vila, 'El cas hongarè s, referè ncia polí tica de la fi del segle XIX', Quadern-El Paí s, 2-5-1991, p. 3. In turn, in the Nineteenth century, Magyar nationalists were acquainted with Ireland's struggle. Again, in the 1960s and 1970s people like the Hungarian poet and novelist Gyula Illyé s (1902-1983) made repeated references to the Basques (George Schö pflin, personal observation).

17. Ernest Gellner, Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983; Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism. London: Duckworth, 1971; Ellie Kedourie, op. cit.

18. See Thomas R. Hart, 'Creating a literature: Mistral and modern Provenç al', Journal of European Studies, 21, 1991, pp. 175-88.

19. Valentí Almirall, Lo catalanisme, Barcelona: Edicions 62/La Caixa, 1979 [1st ed., Barcelona: Llibreria Verdaguer / Ló pez, 1886], pp. 102-3 .

20. Xosé -Manoel Nuñ ez, 'Some international aspects of problems of nationalities in interwar Europe (1919-1939)'. Revised manuscript, 1992. Paper presented at the Colloquium 'Nation et Nationalisme, hier et aujourd'hui', Paris, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 30-31 May 1991. An interesting analysis of the reciprocal influences between Marcus Garvey's Black nationalism, Irish independence struggle, and the Catalan autonomism of Lliga Regionalista, is offered by Gary W. Mc Donogh, 'Other People's Nations: Towards an Interactive Model of Nationalist Movements', Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, XIV, 2, 1987, 297-316.

21. Huge popular mobilisations followed the news that Terence MacSwiney, the Republican Mayor of Cork, died after a prolonged hunger-strike in Brixton Prison. See Terence Folley, 'A Catalan trade union and the Irish war of independence, 1919-1922', Sahotar. Journal of the Irish Labour History Society, nº 10, 1984, pp. 60-67. The referent added popularity to Catalanism and showed how the abnegation and self-sacrifice of an active minority could bring the masses to independence.

22. Its leading ideologist, Engracio de Aranzadi, "was determined to open the movement to the broader currents of European politics. To this end he publicized the struggles of subjugated nationalities, Ö [but] found it convenient at that point to ignore the Irish and the great array of oppressed minorities within the Russian empire" (Stanley G. Payne, Basque Nationalism. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1975, p. 95).

23. In 1921-22, a group of Sinn Fein activists began to extend their propaganda among Basques, Galicians and Catalans. See Dermot Keogh, 'The origins of the Irish foreign service in Europe (1919-1922)', Etudes Irlandaises, nº 8, 1982, pp. 145-164.

24. On womens' participation in the Basque national struggle, see Antonio Elorza, 'Emakume. La mujer en el nacionalismo vasco', Tiempo de Historia, nº 38, 1978, pp. 5-17.

25. According to Glazer, it is even possible to identify a precise moment when this process began: this happened following the passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. Nathan Glazer, Ethnic Dilemmas, 1914-1982. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.

26. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.) Ethnicity. Theory and Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975; Andrew M. Greeley, Why can't they be like us? America' White Ethnic Groups. New York: Dutton, 1971; Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmealtable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in the Seventies. New York: Macmillan, 1972.

27. Pierre Vallieres, Né gres blancs d'Amé rique. Montré al: Ed. Parti-Pris, 1968.

28. On the timing of the new ethnic revival, see Erik Allardt, Implications of the ethnic revival in modern industrialized society. A comparative study of the linguistic minorities in Western Europe. Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium, 12. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1979, pp. 16-7, who confirms that, at least in France, "there was very little indigenous ethnic political agitation from the Liberation to 1968".

29. For instance, Franz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth was regarded for a time by the Black Panthers as their 'bible' (Edmund Burke III, Franz Fanon's 'The Wretched of the Earth', Daedalus, vol. 105, nº 1, 1976, pp. 127-135).

30. See Allardt, op. cit.; Alain Touraine et al., Le pays contre l'Etat. Luttes occitanes. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981; Alain Touraine, 'Sociological Intervention and the Internal Dynamics of the Occitanist Movement', in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (eds) New Nationalisms of the Developed West, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985, pp. 157-175

31. Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People. Basques, Protests, and Politics. Reno, Nevada: Nevada University Press, 1991, p. 158. See also Ortzi, Historia de Euzkadi. El nacionalismo vasco y ETA. Barcelona: Ruedo Ibé rico, 1975; Ortzi, Euskadi. Pueblo y Nació n. 7 vols. San Sebastian: Linorsa, 1991; and José Luis Unzueta, 'La Vª Asamblea de ETA', Saioak, IV, nª 4, 1980, pp. 3-52.

32. JM Benito del Valle and JM Agirre 1979 ETA: Historia e historiar, Punto y Hora, 134, 44-5. The Irgun Z'vai Leumi was founded in the 1940s by Begin and molded into a highly motivated, effective underground army which played a major role in ridding Palestine of British rule.

33. See Garaia, I, 1, 29 September 1976, p. 21.

34. See Jon Nicolas, El grupo Ekin y los primeros pasos, in Documentos Y, vol. 1, pp. 25-8.

35. On De Valera's upholding of these values, see John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism. The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 370-4. Catholicism was instilled in Basque nationalism by its founder Sabino Arana at the turn of the century, but it was rejected in the 1960s, before ETA turned to Marxism.

36. Garaia, I, 1, 29 September 1976, pp. 21-22.

37. The Berbers' struggle against the Spanish army was also part of the Basque and Catalan nationalist mythology: Sabino Arana, the founder of he PNV, claimed that their civilization was superior to that of the Spaniards. On the contrast between the Catalan bourgeoisie's imperialist vocation and anti-war sentiments at the popular level, see Enric Ucelay Da Cal, 'Les simpaties del nacionalisme català pels "Moros": 1900-1936', L'Avenç , nº 28, 1980, pp. 29-40.

38. In the aftermath of the Nazi bombing of Guernica, the book appealed especially to young Basques, who understood Begin's attacks against the former defenseless position of the Jewish people, a situation which he called inexcusable and a 'strong invitation to persecution and massacre'. Also popular among Basque radicals was Begin's widely quoted dictum, "We fight, therefore we are". See Menachem Begin, The Revolt. New York: Nash, 1972 (Hebrew edition: Jerusalem, 1951).

39. Reproduced in Documentos Y, vol. 1, pp. 148-298.

40. Fernando Sarrailh de Ihartza (pseudonym of Federico Krutwig) Vasconia. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Norbait, 1963, p. 10.

41. Franz Fanon, Les damné s de la terre. Paris: Maspero, 1961 [The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove, 1968]. For the influence of Fanon's theory, see Gurutz Jauregui, Ideologí a y estrategia polí tica de ETA. Aná lisis de su evolució n entre 1958 y 1968. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1981.

42. Joseba Zulaika, Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament. Reno, Nevada: Nevada University Press, 1988; William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 'On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the Basque political process', Comparative Study in Society and History, vol. 32, nº 2, 1990, pp. 238-57 (pp. 244-5). See also Ortzi, EuskadiÖ : vol. 2: ch. 2: sections 51 and 58).

43. For instance, the Italian director Gillo Pontecorvo won international recognition in the 1960s for his La battaglia di Algeri (Battle of Algiers) on the Algerian revolution, which also became a cult-movie for the exiled and underground Basque youth and intelligentsia.

44. Jose A. Garmendia, Historia de ETA. Vol. 1 [of 2 vols]. San Sebastian: L. Haranburu, 1979, p. 17.

45. Published anonymously as a special issue of Cuadernos de ETA, nº 20 (1964), Bayonne: Goitziri. Reproduced in Documentos Y, vol. 3, pp. 20-71. The comparisons between the Basques under Franco and other European peoples under Nazi occupation were inevitable and became constant topics of discussion among Basque radicals, especially after the Americans and the West opened up to Franco.

46. Most explanations of the emergence of political violence in the Basque Country focus on the impact of state repression. See Robert P. Clark, 'Euzkadi: Basque Nationalism in Spain since the Civil War', in Charles R. Foster, (ed.), Nations without a State. Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe. New York: Praeger, 1980; id., Negotiating With ETA. Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975-1988. Reno, Nevada: Nevada University Press, 1990; Gurutz Jauregui, op. cit.; William A. Douglass, 'A critique to recent trends in the analysis of ethnonationalism', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 11, nº 2, April 1988, pp. 191-206.

47. Pierre Vilar, Catalunya dins L' Espanya moderna. Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1977, 3 vols. [French original version: La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne, 4 vols., Paris: Flammarion, 1962].

48. Josep Termes, Federalismo, anarcofederalismo y catalanismo. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1976.

49. Yann Foué ré , L'Europe aux cents drapeaux. Paris: Presses d'Europe, 1968; HERAUD, Guy Heraud, L' Europe des ethnies. Presses d' Europe, 1963; A. Marc, L'Europe dans le monde. Paris: Payot, 1965. See Jauregui, Ideologia yÖ , pp. 155 and 199. On the influence of Heraud and others, see Ortzi, Euskadi. Pueblo y Nació n. 7 vols. San Sebastian: Linorsa, 1991, vol 2.

50. Robert Lafont, La ré volution ré gionaliste. Paris: Gallimard, 1967; Sergo Salvi, Le nazioni proibite. Firenze: Vallecchi, 1973; id., Matria e Patria. Firenze: Vallecchi, 1978.

51. Oriol Pi i Sunyer, cited by Walker Connor, 'The political significance Ö , p. 119.

52. See, for instance, the special issue of the radical Basque magazine Punto y Hora dedicated to the "brotherly people of Corsica" (April 1985, nº 385, "Corsica, una historia a sangre y fuego"). The sympathy is reciprocated by Corsican intellectuals who praise the Basque struggle and, in turn, are divided between the autonomists' support for the PNV and the separatists' attraction towards ETA. See A.-L. Bindi, Autonomisme, Luttes d'Emancipation en Corse et Ailleurs, 1984-1989. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1990, pp. 154-50 and 172-5.

53. Probably the experience of Quebec is considered by Catalan nationalists as the one most worth of emulation. Following this trend, numerous contacts have been established between the two countries. See, for instance, Manuel Paré s and Gaë tan Tremblay (eds.) Catalunya, Quebec. Dues nacions, dos models culturals. Ponè ncies del Primer Simposi, Barcelona, maig 1985. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1988; ibid. (eds.) Catalunya, Quebec. Autonomia i mundialització . Ponè ncies del Segon Simposi, Montreal, març 1987. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1990.

54. See Muga, nº 6, 1980, pp. 59-ff. In 1991, the myth of a progressive Algeria has definitively waned after the imposition of martial law. The ensuing killings, jail sentences, and lack of basic freedoms has cast a dark shadow on Algeria's image amongst most liberation movements.

55. A leader from the pro-ETA coalition Herri Batasuna, quoted in The Economist, nº 7715, July 13, 1991, p. 54.

56. See "Euskadi, bajo el 'Balcá n'" (Cambio 16, nº 1027, 29 July 1991, pp. 28-9); El Paí s - Edició n Internacional, 2 September 1991 and 9 September 1991; The Economist, nº 7715, 13 July 1991, pp. 54-5; The European, 16-19 September 1991, pp. 1 and 9; The Independent, 12 September 1991; The Financial Times, 16 September 1991.

57. The Economist, nº 7715, 13 July 1991, p. 54.

58. See El Paí s, 10-10-1990. The document emanated from the more 'hard-line' and militant section of Terra Lliure, the one responsible for several bomb attacks in the past. Its main section subsequently joined the non-violent 'independentist' party ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya).

59. James Kellas, The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism. London: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 93-4, 112-6, 167-8.

60. Zolberg, cited by Horowitz, op. cit., p. 190.

61. Both the Catalan and Basque movements were born or re-born in phases of apparent political quiescence and stability. However, this article focusses on the diffusion of nationalism among the masses, rather than its inception. Popular mobilisations normally occur at times of crucial crisis in the legitimacy of the central government and such crises often coincide with outright regime change.

62. Norway's independence was proclaimed in 1905, but its relatively peaceful and silent achievement did not have a decisive impact on the European mind. See Joan B. Culla i Clarà , 'From Budapest to Dublin by way of Cristiania, or some international models used by the movement for Catalan autonomy', Catalonia Review, nº 1, 1987, pp. 45-55).

63. As the First World War came to a close and the profile of the new Europe emerged with many nationalities freed from alien rule, Catalanism began to raise its expectations. Throughout Catalonia, "Municipal Weeks" were organized and 1046 of the 1072 municipal councils declared themselves in favour of regional autonomy.

64. See Xosé -Manoel Nuñ ez, 'National question and state crisis: Spain, 1898-1936'. Paper presented at the Colloquium 'Rethinking Modern Spain', Florence, 10 May 1991.

65. The Flemish case in Belgium has brought about less sudden and decisive political re-arrangements, while the case of Jura did not alter the basic character of the Swiss state. Rather, it confirmed the canton-based federal structure of Switzerland. In Spain, by contrast, a wholly new Constitution has been framed in order to respond to nationalist aspirations.

66. On the relevance of the avant-garde 'Spanish experiment' for the reshaping of the relations between England and the Celtic fringe, see Tom Gallagher, 'Autonomy in Spain: Lessons for Britain?', in Bernard Crick (ed.) National Identities. The Constitution of the United Kingdom. Oxford: Basil Blackwell /The Political Quarterly, 1991.

67. The extent of the demonstration effect is a "function of the strength and proximity of the demonstration movement" (Horowitz, op. cit., p. 279).

68. Drawing largely from magazine and newspaper excerpts, Horowitz seems to ascribe an excessive capacity to diffusion and emulation, although he finally concedes that "the limitations of external aid make such waves [of diffusion] improbable" (Horowitz, op. cit., p. 281).