

2 Nationalism and political illegitimacy*

Walker Connor

The question, then, can only be put in the following terms: When, in what way, and for what reasons did state and nation come to be so closely linked together as to turn the principle of nationality into the ultimate principle of legitimacy in the modern State?

(Alexander D'Entreves, *The Notion of the State*)

A prefatory note on terminology

The analysis of nationalism has long been hampered by slipshod terminology. If anything, the situation has further deteriorated since 1939, when the Royal Institute of International Affairs prefaced a major study of nationalism with a warning 'Note on the Use of Words', whose opening sentence read: 'Among other difficulties which impede the study of "nationalism", that of language holds a leading place'.¹ English-speaking societies are particularly prone to the careless interutilization of terms which in their pristine usage convey vastly different connotations. Thus, *nation* and *state* are commonly interutilized, and the term *nation-state* is regularly employed indiscriminately to refer both to uninational and multinational entities. As a result of this confusing interutilization of key terms, *nationalism* is used to connote two different concepts which are often in conflict with one another. At times it connotes identification with and loyalty to the nation in the sense of a human grouping which may or may not be essentially coterminous with a state (e.g., Croatian, Fleming, Scottish, or Ukrainian nationalism). More often it is used to connote identification with and loyalty to the 'nation' when the latter is used to indicate the state structure regardless of the national composition of the state's population (e.g., American, Argentinian, Indian, or Filipino nationalism).²

In order to avoid the confusion surrounding two vitally different and often antagonistic loyalties, this writer has found it useful elsewhere to employ the term *patriotism* to refer to state loyalty, and *ethnonationalism* to refer to loyalty to the nation. While this vocabulary serves to distinguish between the two loyalties, it tells us little about the latter. It implies general agreement concerning the meaning of *ethnic* which, unfortunately, is not the case. As used today by most American sociologists,

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ethnic group is used to connote 'a group with a common cultural tradition and a sense of identity which exists as a subgroup of a larger society'.³ Such a definition makes ethnic group and minority synonymous, and could not therefore apply to the dominant peoples within a state (e.g., the English or German people), or within several states (e.g., the Arabs).

Originally, both *nation* and *ethnic* group referred to a group characterized by common descent. (*Ethnic* derives from the Greek *Ethnos* and *nation* from the past participle of the Latin verb *nasci*, meaning 'to be born'.) Max Weber, however, has pointed out that the key element is not the reality but the *myth* of common descent.

The belief in group affinity, regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important consequences, especially for the formation of a political community. We shall call 'ethnic groups' those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent . . . this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (*Gemeinsamkeit*) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity . . .⁴

Elsewhere, Weber notes that 'the concept of "nationality" [or 'nation'] shares with that of the "people" (*Volk*) – in the "ethnic" sense – the vague connotation that whatever is felt to be distinctively common must derive from common descent.'⁵ In a similar vein, Tomotshu Shibutani and Kian Kwan define an ethnic group as composed of 'those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others.'⁶ An old European definition of a nation, which was intended to be humorous and derisive and which Karl Deutsch cites as such, hit almost the same mark: 'A nation is a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors.'⁷

Although all of the preceding definitions are acceptable to this writer, they leave the student of nation-formation still in need of a term to describe a group of people who have not achieved group-consciousness, but who, in the opinion of outside observers, are most apt ultimately to form a nation. Throughout large sections of the globe, meaningful identity is still restricted to the clan, village, or region.⁸ It is therefore convenient to use ethnic group to refer to groups of people, such as the Quechuan-speaking people of South America or the Pushtu-speaking people of the Afghan-Pakistani border-region, who, though not as yet, are each apt someday to coalesce into a self-aware, self-differentiating national group. *Nation* is thus reserved for ethnic groups who have in fact achieved group self-awareness. As used herein, then, a *nation* is a self-differentiating ethnic group. *State* refers to one of the *major* political divisions of the globe. It does not, however, refer to a further subdivision, such as Bihar, California, Mato Grosso, or Saxony, even though such subdivisions are called states within their particular political structure. *Nationalism* and *ethnonationalism* both connote identity with and loyalty to the *nation*. *Patriotism* connotes identity with and loyalty to the state.

Self-determination

The doctrine that a people ought not to be ruled by those deemed aliens has rapidly gained converts during the past two centuries. At first untitled, then referred to as ‘the principle of nationalities’, and more recently as ‘national self-determination’, the doctrine postulates that any people, simply because it considers itself to be a separate people, has the right, if it so desires, to form its own state.⁹ As such, it presumes that nationhood (national consciousness) constitutes the ultimate standard for gauging political legitimacy. By definition, no justification advanced for exercising political rule over a multinational unit can stand against it. Thus, when the government of a multinational state advances the argument that the minority has in fact enjoyed educational, economic, security-related, or other tangible advantages as a consequence of living within the state, advantages that would be lost with secession, the government thereby only presents an argument as to why a minority should rationally elect not to secede, but it does not thereby deny the fundamental right of the national minority to make the decision. On the contrary, it thereby implies that the right of decision rests with the group. Indeed, though in practice governments have been most reluctant to permit a valid measurement of a national group’s sentiment with regard to secession, they have rarely denied *in abstracto* the right of a national group to secede. Governments have been more prone to conduct patently spurious plebiscites¹⁰ or, even more commonly, to assert that the overwhelming majority of the group favor continued union and that whatever agitation the outsider can perceive is merely the handiwork of a few malcontents or *agents provocateurs*.¹¹ But by such studied efforts to avoid any public disavowal of the right which in practice they go to great lengths to deny, such governments in fact manifest a profound appreciation for the legitimizing power of the self-determination principle.¹² Phrased differently, though the political leaders of a multinational state do not themselves accept the proposition that the right to answer the question of whether or not a polity has a *legitimate* claim to the allegiance of a national group is the exclusive prerogative of the group itself, those same leaders do, by their indirection, indicate a belief that the proposition is a broadly held matter of conviction both within and without their country.¹³

Levels of legitimacy

By genus, then, national self-determination is an assertion of political legitimacy. But while it might therefore be anticipated that the literature on political legitimacy would prove of substantial benefit to the student of nationalism and nationalist movements, such expectations result in disappointment. More than a decade ago, a prominent political scientist compiled a listing of what he termed ‘common but ambiguous political concepts’.¹⁴ He warned that each of the itemized concepts could vary in meaning (a) depending upon the context within which the term was used, and (b) from user to user even with regard to the same context. Quite appropriately, legitimacy was included on the list.

The deficiency is both quantitative and qualitative. Considering its centrality to the discipline of political science, remarkably few attempts to subject the notion of

political legitimacy to rigorous and comprehensive analysis have been undertaken.¹⁵ Most authors who touch upon the subject of legitimacy do so only implicitly and often unwittingly. Moreover, though the issue of why any group of people ought to submit to being ruled is one of the vital, pervasive, and enduring questions of political philosophy, scholarly histories of political thought fail to synthesize thinking on the topic. Such works are peppered with separate commentaries on the notion of legitimacy as found in the writings of one or another philosopher, but offer no focussed discussion of legitimacy *per se*.¹⁶

The tendency to ignore or slight the concept of legitimacy is underscored when one searches for a definition. Dictionaries of political science customarily contain no such entry.¹⁷ Nor do similar works in philosophy.¹⁸ Though by no means perfect, the record of sociological dictionaries is much better, probably because (a) sociologists claim Max Weber as one of their own, and (b) the notion of legitimacy was a major element in Weber's writings.¹⁹ But though he often used the term, Weber apparently also neglected to offer a definition.²⁰

It may well be that those authorities who have neglected to offer a definition of political legitimacy have done so because they consider the concept to be self-explanatory and unambiguous.²¹ If so, they are mistaken. Particularly injurious to scholarship has been the failure to distinguish between levels of legitimacy, for proper analysis requires an awareness of at least three distinct categories:

- (1) *regime-legitimacy* refers to the propriety or rightfulness of the rule of a particular individual, clique, or administration.
- (2) *government-legitimacy* is associated with a particular form of government and with its corresponding ideology and institutions, regardless of the individuals who momentarily occupy its key positions.
- (3) *state-legitimacy*, the broadest of these categories, is concerned with the justification of the political unit itself, rather than with either individuals or governments.

As is customarily true with social classifications, these three categories in practice often blur into one another. The case for legitimacy of the German Third Reich, for example, rested upon an indissoluble intertwining of (1) the Leader, (2) government by a party-élite with its own ideology (Nazism), and (3) the racial (read national) state and its destiny. Nevertheless, an awareness of the distinctions among the three levels of legitimacy is vital, because forces challenging legitimacy at one political level need not pose a threat to another.²² What is essential for this discussion, however, is the fact that the relationship of state-legitimacy to the other two classifications is that of the whole to the parts. To deny legitimacy to a regime is not to deny it to a government. To deny legitimacy to either a regime or a government is not to deny it to a state. To deny it to a state is to deny it to all three levels.

In most but not all cases, the type of activity engaged in as a means of remedying a matter of political illegitimacy will identify the level of legitimacy being attacked. A pairing of some common political activities with the level of legitimacy that they challenge would appear as follows:

<i>Level of legitimacy under challenge</i>	<i>Form assumed by the challenge</i>
Regime-legitimacy	Recall, vote of no confidence, impeachment, assassination, 'palace revolution', coup d'état
Government-legitimacy	Political revolution
State-legitimacy	Secessionist movement

The schematic does not include all common types of political activity. To name but three omissions, politically motivated riots and revolts have been excluded because they may serve as a vehicle for challenging legitimacy at the regime-, government-, or state-level, and autonomist movements have been excluded because they can represent a challenge to either government- or state-legitimacy.²³

The literature on legitimacy ignores this triadic classification. Moreover, while failing to make these distinctions, the writings of the leading contemporary authorities on legitimacy make manifest that their authors have been concerned with *only* regime- and/or government-legitimacy.²⁴ And, since national self-determination is an assertion concerning state-legitimacy, this literature seldom, if ever, mentions it.

The neglect of national self-determination by contemporary authorities on legitimacy may therefore be viewed as a consequence of their general inattention to state-legitimacy. But if we turn from contemporary writing to the history of political thought, how are we to explain the fact that none of the renowned political philosophers anticipated, much less attempted to legitimize, the notion of national self-determination prior to its actual surfacing in the late eighteenth century?²⁵

As noted, the issue of why people should submit to *any* authority is a central question to philosophy, and, over the centuries, several political philosophers had addressed themselves to the ostensible purpose and justification of the state.²⁶ However, in part precisely because they did contemplate the *state*, their discourses also bear little pertinence to the notion of national self-determination. Treating, as they did, the state *in abstracto*, they reveal little concerning the rightful jurisdiction of such a polity. To Plato, the end-purpose and justification of the state may have been justice; to Aristotle, that purpose was 'the highest good, i.e . . . to produce a certain moral character in citizens, namely a disposition to virtue and the performance of virtuous actions';²⁷ to Hobbes, it was peace and order. But such goals are in fact related more to regime- and government-legitimacy than to state-legitimacy. They disclose nothing about the citizenry to be incorporated. If a regime or government promotes justice, virtue, or domestic tranquility, it is owed legitimacy; if it does not, then it is not. Such models could conceivably pertain to a village-size community or to a universal political structure. The envisaged state could be coterminous with a single religion or be multireligious. It could be monoracial or multiracial, monolingual or multilingual, national or multinational.

Popular popular sovereignty

The idea of national self-determination therefore arrived on stage without the benefit of intellectual heralds. Those writers most intimately associated with it (such as

Johann Fichte, Ernst Arndt, Friedrich Jahn, Frantisek Palacky, and Giuseppe Mazzini) are its disciples rather than its prophets.²⁸ How can one explain the emergence of an idea without prophesiers? This seemingly enigmatic feature of the history of national self-determination may quite paradoxically serve as a signpost to the nature of national self-determination, including its claim of legitimacy. It suggests that the idea of national self-determination did not in and by itself represent a totally new, self-contained principle of politics but was merely a variant of some other concept. A study of the intellectual and political milieu at the time of its emergence suggests that popular sovereignty is that concept, and that national self-determination is best understood as a natural outgrowth or special interpretation of the notion of popular sovereignty.

Two preconditions were indispensable for the gestation of the self-determination idea: (1) the national consciousness of peoples and (2) the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The necessity for the former need not long detain us. A people must be aware that they constitute a national group before they insist on rights – political or otherwise – in the name of the nation. Even today, many people have not achieved national awareness. To them, the meaningful world still ends with the village, region, clan, or tribe. However, many, though certainly not all, peoples of Europe had achieved a large measure of national consciousness before the French Revolution ushered in the Age of Nationalism, so we can conclude that national consciousness was a *necessary* but not a *sufficient* condition for the advent of national self-determination. Popular sovereignty – the notion that ultimate political authority rests with the people – was the other necessary part of the equation.

With senses grown numb from too repetitious encounters with the expression *popular sovereignty*, and with the nearly uncontested status of the doctrine today, it is difficult to appreciate the truly revolutionary implications of this concept as recently as two-hundred years ago. Previously, the right to rule might have been defended as a gift from the gods (divine right), as a prerogative of royal blood, as the spoils of conquest, as a hereditary legacy, as a fidelity owed because of protection and/or other services rendered (feudalism), as flowing from the possession of the title to the property inhabited by the subjects, or as a combination of any of these. All such theories of politics shared the negative presumption that legitimacy had nothing to do with those who were ruled. The masses were solely the object, not the source of political authority. And if the people are not germane to the issue of legitimacy, then it follows that their ethnicity is not, either. Divine ordination, royal (in contradistinction to national) blood, inheritance, right of conquest, and the like, make no allowance for ethnonational considerations. And thus, prior to the French Revolution, the borders of empires, city-states, princely states, and even the post-1648, so-called ‘modern states’, were drawn with little or no regard for ethnic considerations. Ethnic distributional patterns were safely ignored without thereby risking a challenge to the state’s legitimacy. But in a single sweep, the notion of popular sovereignty undermined all such claims to legitimacy, and thereby infused ethnicity with a combustible political potential.

The notion of popular sovereignty did not just burst upon the scene. Unlike national self-determination, it had had its proponents among political philosophers

dating back to ancient times. Within such circles, it appeared to grow progressively more popular, and the late Charles Merriam, one of its more august chroniclers, informs us that well before the close of the Middle Ages, it had become almost *the theory* of legitimacy among scholars.

So universally prevalent was the idea of original popular sovereignty that ‘from the end of the 13th century it was an axiom of political theory that the justification of all government lay in the voluntary submission of the community ruled.’ Government based on the consent of the governed was the ruling theory in the Middle Ages.²⁹

But if popular sovereignty had become a favorite of philosophers by the 1300s, it continued to lack for practitioners for hundreds of years thereafter. Why were there no fifteenth-, sixteenth-, or seventeenth-century Bismarcks, Cavours, O’Connells, or Sun Yat-sens? The philosophers’ concept of *the people* in whom sovereignty was said to be vested appears to have been too abstractly intellectual, too remote from human experiences and sensations, to have ignited crusades in its name. Who was this otherwise undifferentiated and unidentified *people*? What Joseph de Maistre in 1796 would deprecatingly say of the notion of *man* (as embodied in the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen) would apply, with at least equal validity, to the notion of *the people*.

During my life, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, and so on; thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be Persian; but I must say, as for *man* [read: *the people*], I have never come across him anywhere; if he exists, he is completely unknown to me.³⁰

History would record that it was indeed primarily through ‘Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, and so on’ that popular sovereignty was to be carried throughout the globe. Article 2 of the very Declaration against which de Maistre inveighed first illustrated what a short, almost imperceptible and unconscious transition it was from the notion of *the people* to *my people*, that is to say, *my nation*: ‘The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; no group, no individual, may exercise authority not emanating expressly therefrom.’ Similarly, note how a reviewer of a book on the French Revolution made this same unconscious linkage of popular sovereignty with the nation:

Popular sovereignty is an awesome idea precisely because it means nothing less than the existential freedom of a people to be responsible for its own fate, without recourse to any ‘father’. The regicides created this terrible and magnificent freedom, the only one commensurate with the fullness of human potential. With the execution of Louis, they could solemnly declare to the nation: ‘From this moment, one will no longer write the history of France, but rather the history of the French.’³¹

In short, *l’état c’est moi* had become *l’état c’est nous*, and the *nous* was identified with the nation.³²

From the vantage point of abstract logic, some such further refinement of *the*

people was necessary if popular sovereignty were to serve as an adequate theory of state legitimation. Otherwise, the extent of a state's proper jurisdiction could not be ascertained. It is, in effect, the manner in which one definitionally draws the human borders of a state that defines the state's claim to legitimacy. For example, Ernest Renan's 'plebiscite of every day' recommends itself as an apt description of the legitimizing principle which infuses popular sovereignty.³³ But as in the case of the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, the phrase tells us nothing about the limits of such a state. Certainly Renan did not mean that any individual or group whose plebiscitary inclination was negative had the right of secession. But without such an option, his state, just as those of the earlier theorists, could be racially, ethnically, and culturally homogeneous *or* heterogeneous.³⁴

There were, to be sure, alternative ways of defining *the people* in addition to making it coincidental with an ethnonation. Particularly where great distance intervened between two human segments of a single polity and where a clear ethnic division was absent, geography might become the principal criterion for defining a people who were said to possess a right to secede under the doctrine of popular sovereignty.³⁵ Thus, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century secessions of the North and South American colonies were manifestations of secession conducted in the name of popular sovereignty, but not of secession in its national form. Similarly, in a situation where a state has been constructed without the emotional mortar of an ethnic bond, geographic or regional secession (in contradistinction to national secession) is always a possibility.³⁶ Immigrant states – such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States – whose mythical, 'typical' citizen is a polygenetic figure, are particularly susceptible to such challenges.³⁷ Moreover, as we are reminded by the successful movement to create Pakistan as one of two successor states to what had been a single British India, a decision to define the people in religious terms cannot be totally ruled out.

Nevertheless, as evidenced by the comparative scarcity of regional secessions since the late eighteenth century, as well as by one already successful and several other current ethnonationally inspired secessionist challenges against Pakistan, incontestably the most common variant of popular sovereignty has been the national one. Nearly everywhere, it proved to be the equating of *the people* with *my people*, that is to say, with *my nation*, that was to breathe life into the otherwise sterile concept of popular sovereignty. It would, therefore, not be too amiss to define national self-determination as *popular* popular sovereignty. Once the nation has been substituted for *the people*, it is the national group that becomes the final arbiter in determining whether the state or states in which it resides is to be perceived as legitimate or illegitimate. 'Let my people go!' therefore became an increasingly common ejaculation of nationally conscious minorities.

The changes in political borders wrought by this new standard of legitimacy in its as yet relatively short history are astonishing. In the one hundred and thirty year period separating the Napoleonic Wars from the end of World War II, all but three of Europe's states had either lost extensive territory and population because of ethnonational movements or were themselves newly created 'self-determined' states.³⁸ The impact upon non-European areas during this period was far less pronounced.³⁹

However, one increasingly detected the message of national popular sovereignty in the growing demands – heard both in the local colonies and in their mother countries – for decolonization.

Since the newly emancipated colonies were themselves almost uniformly ethnically heterogeneous, it might be argued that decolonialism should be treated as equivalent to geographic rather than to national secession. However, it was under the banner which proclaimed that a people ought not to be ruled by those deemed aliens that the decolonial campaigns were waged. The liberation movements were indeed multiethnic in their composition, but there was agreement among the ruled (or, more accurately, among their élites) on the need to rid the system of the *most alien* element. And *most alien* was a judgment predicated more upon skin pigmentation than upon geography.⁴⁰ Indeed, one of the many whimsical aspects of the history of national movements conducted by minorities has been the frequency with which the new state that they seek to create will also, in turn, contain minorities. The recent proliferation of national movements within the former colonies, as well as within the older states of Europe, illustrates, however, that self-determined states which contain minorities can expect internal movements demanding that the principle of ethnonational legitimacy be carried further toward fulfillment. Approximately half of all contemporary states have recently experienced ethnonationally inspired dissonance, and the list can be expected to grow.⁴¹ Most significantly, the list of afflicted states suggests that no categorization of multinational states is immune. The contagion of ethnonationalism has exhibited an unusual level of immunity from all of the customary variables, such as median income, degree of urbanization, level of industrialization, literacy rate, geographic location, form of government, socioeconomic philosophy, and even the length of time that the state has been in existence.⁴²

The irregular trajectory of self-determination

Once underway, then, the idea of national self-determination has rapidly gained converts. However, this trend toward universalization of the idea has not been one of uniform progress, but one which has proceeded with troughs (e.g., the seeming serenity of most of the national minorities of Western Europe from 1945 to 1965) and with swells (e.g., the widespread national unrest within Europe in 1848, again in the 1890s, and still again in the early 1970s).⁴³ The irregularity of the pattern may be attributed in part to the fact that the world's ethnic groups have achieved national awareness at different points in history, that a great many groups had not achieved it at the time of the French Revolution, and that, though several have subsequently done so, many others have yet to achieve it. Since national consciousness is one of the two necessary preconditions of the linkage of ethnicity and legitimacy, it follows that group appreciation of that linkage has also emerged somewhat sporadically.⁴⁴

Catalysts and soporifics have also been at work.⁴⁵ Among the former might be mentioned (1) the demonstration effect which caused each national movement to give rise in other minds to the question, 'If they have that right, why do not my people also?'; (2) increases in the intensity of contacts among national groups due to quantitative and qualitative improvements in communications and transportation

(and often given a special impetus by an alien invasion or occupation of the ethnic homeland); (3) the increasing evidence that small as well as 'great' nations could operate a viable state; (4) changes in the world power scene and in the prevailing attitudes of influential élites which made it decreasingly likely that a weak people might achieve independence, only to be swallowed up by another; and (5) the fame and prestige sporadically accorded to the doctrine of a natural linkage between ethnicity and legitimacy because of its public espousal by such luminaries as Napoleon Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Lenin, and Woodrow Wilson. Somnolence, on the other hand, has often been encouraged by a periodic decimation of potential leadership,⁴⁶ or by the reaction that follows immediately in the wake of a war or insurrection involving militant nationalism.⁴⁷

Beyond all of these considerations, however, it is in the very nature of ideas to evolve in irregular fits and starts. The idea of popular sovereignty permeated the world of intellect long before it elicited popular support in the world of action. Its subsequent history further illustrates the paradoxes that one is apt to encounter when reviewing the history of an idea. It also sheds additional light on the interaction between the idea of popular sovereignty *per se* and its particular form of national self-determination.

A major reason why the close interrelationship between self-determination and popular sovereignty has not been readily recognized is that we confront national self-determination movements where we do not see democratic forms, and popular sovereignty would appear to demand democracy. In theory this might be correct, but in practice it certainly has not been. Democracy requires popular sovereignty, but the reverse is not true. Authoritarianism proved sufficiently elastic to thrive in a world in which popular sovereignty appeared destined to become the universal principle of politics. Earlier we examined popular sovereignty from the viewpoint of its mass converts, and noted that national groups were the principal key to its propagation. But as an illusionary fiction rather than as a reality, its propagation has been materially assisted by authoritarian regimes and individuals who were its opportunistic manipulators rather than its devotees. Modern authoritarians, in substance not different from their pre-eighteenth-century counterparts, learned to mask their own notions of the font of political power behind formal lip service to the notion that the source of all legitimate authority is *the people*.

Authoritarianism, as well as democracy, may, of course, exist in either ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous states. With an eye to events in Germany and Japan during the 1930s and 1940s, it also appears evident that the ethnically homogeneous (or near homogeneous) environment affords the best opportunity for an extreme aggrandizement of power through the manipulation of ethnonational proclivities in a manner to induce the *voluntary*, unrestrained submission of the masses to the will of the leadership. If leaders are able to convince the masses that theirs is the legitimate voice of the nation – the expression of the nation's will – the subsequent sense of fidelity and blind faith reposed in their person by the masses will be far more unrepressed and unconditional than would be the case were the leader a mere political figure, no matter how respected or charismatic (e.g., a Hitler versus an Eisenhower or Kennedy). If such ethnonational leaders arise not just within a nation

but within a true nation-state, they will be further aided in the quest for supreme power by having at their disposal the state's multi-faceted capacity for persuasion and coercion. Napoleon was the first major figure to grasp the significance of joining ethnonational and state-legitimacy. A Corsican of Genovese descent who fought for Corsican independence as a youth, Napoleon later realized that his personal ambitions could be better fulfilled by the harnessing of the masses' ethnonational zeal to an established state structure. This in turn required an overt transformation of his ethnic heritage, a deception accomplished by the simple expedient of frenchifying the spelling and pronunciation of his family name. He would justify his subsequent, highly autocratic tenure of office as follows: 'We have been guided at all times by this great truth: that the sovereignty resides in the French people in the sense that everything, everything without exception, must be done for its best interests, for its well being, and for its glory.'⁴⁸ And later imitators who would similarly countenance no resistance to their will, would nonetheless eschew titles such as emperor in lieu of the leader of the national group that is, *der Führer* or *il Duce*.

The authoritarian figure in an ethnically homogeneous state therefore has been able to exploit the coincidence of *the people* with *the nation*. But such states are exceptions. Authoritarian figures in the ethnically complex state, who wish to strengthen their legitimacy by paying lip-service to the masses as the font of legitimacy, will find it convenient to address their remarks to *the people* or *the citizenry*, while glossing over ethnic considerations. But this compulsion to pay lip-service to the masses as the repository from which all political legitimacy flows has become a nearly universal concomitant of modern authoritarianism, and, as a result, the notion of popular sovereignty (though not *popular* popular sovereignty) has nearly completed its global sweep. Rare indeed is the state leader who fails to pay formal homage to the people and their destiny as the source of his power and his *raison d'être*.⁴⁹ Systems claiming to be old-styled monarchies, sheikdoms, or empires are now in danger of extinction.⁵⁰ Recent events in Ethiopia represented a major milepost in the demise of such *ancien régimes*. Therein, Haile Selassie, purportedly the 225th successor to a hereditary title dating back 3,000 years to the Queen of Sheba, was overthrown. The military junta which engineered the coup against the world's oldest claim to legitimacy was certainly at least as authoritarian as had been the Emperor, but their right to take such action was justified by their self-depiction 'as representatives and guardians of the interests of the people.'⁵¹

Marxist-Leninist states were a part of this sweeping nominal victory of popular sovereignty. Though Marxists define the state in which they have come to power as 'the dictatorship of the proletariat', the proletariat is in its essence the people, minus a remnant of bourgeois, anti-state counterrevolutionaries. And after a sufficient lapse of time to permit such elements to wither or reform, *the proletariat* and *the people* should become synonymous. For all practical purpose, therefore, the Soviet Union's 1936 constitutional assertion that 'all power is vested in the working people' could be construed as an unequivocal commitment to popular sovereignty.⁵² And Premier Khrushchev's reference to the 'state of all the people',⁵³ later incorporated into the 1977 constitution, did not represent a radical departure from Marxist-Leninist political thinking.⁵⁴

By and large, then, state leaders have been preachers but not practitioners of popular sovereignty. But as Georges Sorel reminded us, myths have a way of providing their own reality.⁵⁵ In acknowledging and publicizing the principle that all legitimate power derives from *the people*, governments have been preparing the scene for that mental metamorphosis which changes *the people* into *my people*. And among minorities this substitution presages increased sentiment for national self-determination. It bears repeating that once it is popularly assumed that sovereignty resides in the people, then any people who conceive themselves as constituting a separate people is apt to view a right to create its own state as self-evident and therefore incontestable. As a result, even decidedly non-democratic governments, in paying lip-service to popular sovereignty, have helped to spawn that doctrine's national variety.⁵⁶

This does not imply that each state must formally adopt the principle of popular sovereignty before it is apt to face internal challenges to its legitimacy predicated upon national aspirations. Just as the notion of popular sovereignty often became activated within an *ancien régime* as a response to foreign precedent, so too can its national variety. And as the number of such precedents has increased, the likelihood of one or several of them serving as catalysts has also increased. Any state is therefore vulnerable. But leaders who, regardless of their sincerity, repeatedly refer to *the people* in reverential terms as the source of legitimacy, thereby fertilize the local soil for the implanting of the idea of national self-determination.

Multinational states all along the democratic–authoritarian spectrum have therefore proven vulnerable to national movements. But do not such movements constitute a more natural foe of those multinational states tending toward the democratic pole of that spectrum? If a system is to remain *truly* (not just ostensibly) committed to the legitimizing principle of popular sovereignty, can it logically deny that doctrine's national variant? John Stuart Mill thought not:

Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race would be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they would choose to associate themselves.⁵⁷

To Ernest Barker, who agreed with Mill, the result was predictable: unassimilated democratic states will tend to dissolve into as many democracies as there are nations within them.⁵⁸ Recent events within Canada and the democracies of Western Europe support such a prognostication. On the other hand, the significant fact may be that many old democracies, despite ethnically predicated fissures, have managed to hang together. How is one to account for their preservation throughout two-hundred years of the national epoch?

The matter may perhaps be best approached by considering all states, democratic and non-democratic alike. If national self-determination is such a generally

compelling force, a natural inclination of people, why are there so few nation-states? How can one account for the poor record of self-determination to date? Elsewhere, this writer has attempted to analyze the reasons for the unenviable record of militant self-determination movements and suggested several reasons, the most important of which was the inherently negative view that governments take of such movements and the disproportionate advantages that governments have at their disposal in such a confrontation.⁵⁹ But while such explanations may aid in understanding the lack of success of active movements which clearly have enjoyed broadscale support throughout their respective nation, movements such as those among the Kurds and the Ibos, they do not explain why most nations have not exemplified a similar, grass roots devotion to national independence, regardless of the odds. And they certainly do not explain why people in a democratic society have not voted overwhelmingly for separatist parties. The survival of the multinational state as the principal form of polity, some two hundred years into the national era, raises the ultimate question concerning state legitimacy. Is legitimacy necessary for a state to survive in relative peace? Will people often passively accept the fact of existence within a state to which they do not extend a sense of legitimacy?

The non-essentiality of state legitimacy

The literature has assumed that legitimacy is necessary for a modern state to function.⁶⁰ Beginning with the observation that coercion, by itself, is counterproductive and therefore an insufficient foundation upon which to construct a durable, functioning system, authorities have considered a lack of extensive, overt coercion, when combined with a low level of visible resistance to the system, as evidence that the system enjoys legitimacy. As a syllogism, this reasoning would proceed as follows:

- (1) Coercion cannot constitute a sufficient foundation for the maintenance of a viable political system.
- (2) Political System X is (a) not characterized by coercion and (b) has been maintained over an extended period of time.
- (3) Therefore, Political System X must be viewed as legitimate by all major segments of the population.

This syllogism is defective, because a wealth of evidence indicates that systems (regimes, governments, and states) can enjoy a calm atmosphere in the absence of legitimacy.

Most multinational states are not characterized by an excessive level of discernible coercion. Yet, the foreign policies of states demonstrate a broadly held conviction among political leaders that national minorities within other states do not perceive the system under which they are ruled as legitimate. Foreign governments commonly perceive minorities as discontented Trojan horses. Lenin, for example, assigned the technique of appealing to the congenital discontent of national minorities a major role in ushering a communist party into power. And, indeed, the promise of self-determination, explicitly including the right of secession, made to

their country's respective minorities played a vital role in the assumption of power by the communist parties of the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam (that is to say, the four major parties which could claim to have come to power essentially on their own devices). Somewhat similarly, fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan also exploited the dissatisfaction of national minorities and succeeded with such peoples as the Bretons, Croatians, Flemings, Manchus, Mongols, Sardinians, and Slovaks. Today, appeals to one another's minorities are a major element in the relations among numerous sets of states including China and the Soviet Union, Libya and Chad, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, Angola and Zaire, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Cambodia and Vietnam, Ethiopia and Somalia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and Yugoslavia and Albania. The list could be multiplied. We have here, then, a time-tested stratagem of foreign policy, geared to the well-founded presumption that significant segments of a national minority do not perceive their current political status as legitimate.

What is particularly significant is that in many cases where a minority has in fact proven to be a Trojan horse, there has been no appreciable prewarning that the minority did not perceive its state as politically legitimate. The Ukrainians offered a striking example at the time of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. That people's initial positive reception showered upon the invaders stunned Soviet leaders, who, given their reporting apparatus, would have been expected to be amongst the best informed of state-regimes.

In general, people can pursue their daily business, obey the laws, go to work, and the like, while living in a state to which they do not accord legitimacy. Consider, for example, the case of the Franco-Canadians whose general demeanor over the generations could be generally characterized as peaceful. But, during both World Wars, attempts to introduce compulsory military conscription precipitated large-scale draft riots and a stout resistance to fighting what Franco-Canadian leaders termed 'English wars.' Being, in their eyes, a non-legitimate political expression of the Québécois, the state of Canada could not elicit any real sacrifice in its name.

Or consider the following historical sketch of Northern Ireland, which illustrates that the Irish minority has never attached legitimacy to the Stormont government. And yet, until quite recently, this negative attitude toward the system did not take the form of violence.

From the mid-1920s when the fighting over partition ended until the late 1960s when the conflict was renewed, Ulster was relatively peaceful, with 18 deaths traced to ethnic conflict. During this interlude, London was relatively indifferent to Northern Ireland's affairs, and Ulster's politics and government were dominated by the Ulster Unionist Party, representing the Protestant majority. Conservative in their politics and economics, the Unionists encountered little opposition from class-based parties like the Northern Ireland Labour party, a stable minority party. Catholics voted for parties dedicated to ending partition, and their elected leaders, rejecting the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland government, often boycotted their seats in the Ulster Parliament and refused to accept the title of loyal opposition when they did take their seats.⁶¹

Numerous other cases abound, as well, where minorities have undergone long periods of seeming acquiescence while withholding legitimacy from the state. The Spanish Basques, after exploiting the chaos of the 1930s to vote themselves independence, were almost immediately reunited by Franco in what superficially appeared to be a harmonious relationship with the Spanish state. Over the next forty years, the area became Spain's leading industrial and most prosperous region, free of overt manifestations of ethnonational dissatisfaction. The illusionary nature of this surface calm became increasingly apparent in the late 1960s, as priests and members of the militant, separatist organization, ETA, spearheaded an anti-Madrid movement. By 1978, more than two-thirds of all Basques demonstrated their lack of identification with the Spanish state by either abstaining or voting negatively with regard to a new democratic constitution that would accord the Basques far more autonomy than they had at any time other than their short-lived period of independence during the 1930s.⁶²

The history of the Croats is similar. After docilely accepting union in a state dominated by Serbs at the end of World War I, the Croats subsequently found this relationship so intolerable that they accepted Hitler's offer of a puppet state, and took advantage of this period to wreak genocidal vengeance upon the Serbian community within Croatia. Following the war, an outwardly serene reunion with the Yugoslav state was interrupted in the 1970s by an outburst of anti-Belgrade nationalist fervor. Though the conventional prediction of the time was that this most recent demonstration of Croatian nationalism could only be quenched with political independence, the agitation was silenced by a purge of the leaders, and the streets of Zagreb became once more as peaceful and serene as those of Belgrade. But Croatian history warns against mistaking this most recent period of overt passivity as evidence that Yugoslavia has gained legitimacy in Croatian eyes.

The point, then, is that legitimacy cannot be inferred from a peaceful situation. There are several overlapping factors that may explain docility in the absence of a feeling that one's state is legitimate. The following is at best a rough outline of some of these factors:

(1) *Fear*: Granted that violent coercion cannot be used too frequently or too long or in too heavy doses, its periodic, small-scale application to 'examples' may prove a very effective means of persuading a population that overt resistance to an unpopular political system is not worth the entailed risk. How fear of reprisal can dampen a population's will has been eloquently captured by the former editor of a Czechoslovak journal:

Where government stands for a long time, the citizen falls. Where does he fall? I will not try to please the non-Marxist enemy and say that he falls on the gallows. Only a few tens or hundreds of citizens do that. Our friends know that it is sufficient because it is followed by the fall of, perhaps, the whole nation into fear, into political indifference and resignation, into petty daily cares and little desires, into dependence on gradually tinier and tinier overlords, into a serfdom of a new and unusual type, impossible to explain to a visitor from abroad.⁶³

Fears of physical coercion or incarceration fail to explain why people in a democratic society do not vote for nationalist parties. But fears can be wide-ranging, and the prospect of secession can raise fear of the unknown, the untraveled road. It can also raise fears, particularly among the elderly, of unemployment or of no governmental old-age assistance. It is probably not just coincidence that professional people, those with a sense of security and independence because of their training and vocation, have been disproportionately represented in separatist movements, and that, as one moves from the middle-aged to the post-middle-aged element, support for such movements sharply decreases.

(2) *Habit*: Aristotle was among the very earliest of philosophers to indicate the link between habit and political behavior. In emphasizing the consensual rather than the coercive side of law enforcement, he noted that 'the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time.'⁶⁴ Some two thousand years later, Max Weber, while substituting the word *custom* for *habit*, would substantively agree. Though noting that our knowledge as yet 'does not allow us to determine very clearly the point of transition from the stage of mere custom to the, at first vaguely and dimly experienced, "consensual" character of social action', Weber nonetheless insisted that habit is a principal reason why people obey the laws of the society in which they reside. Tradition, in the active form of habit, exerts an *oughtness* of its own. Most significantly, it is a force militating against change: 'The inner orientation toward such regularities contains in itself very tangible inhibitions against "innovations."⁶⁵ Particularly when combined with fear of the unknown, the comfortableness of that with which one is familiar would explain a timidity concerning such an all-encompassing 'innovation' as a new state.⁶⁶

(3) *Apathy and/or Inertia*: Apathy can, of course, be further broken down into a number of explanations ranging from a psychological state of mind such as fatalism ('If Allah wills . . .') to the prevalence of energy-sapping parasites. In any case, it is one thing to grumble about the illegitimacy of rule by the Castilians, Han Chinese, or French, and something else to become actively engaged in terminating that rule. Even powerful mass movements may be divided into activists and sympathizers. Thus, the number of people actually willing to serve as guerrillas in a national war of liberation may be meager, while the number who demonstrate their agreement with the guerrillas concerning the illegitimacy of the political system by the passive act of refusing to give information on the guerrillas' whereabouts, despite governmental threats and offers of rewards, is necessarily impressive, or the guerrillas could not survive. But again, such a conviction concerning political legitimacy is for many not sufficient to motivate positive activity.

(4) *Apoliticalness*: If economists tend to place too much emphasis upon economic motivation, political scientists are prone to exaggerate the degree to which the typical person is emotionally involved in political matters. So-called highly authoritarian states often offer bewildering experiences to the visitor, who finds people pursuing their life-ways with apparent good cheer and outwardness. Such people have learned to accommodate themselves comfortably within limits prescribed by the authorities. The injunction not to speak or act in any way that

could be construed as ‘antistate activity’ does not weigh heavily on some shoulders. What the earlier cited Czech dissenter termed the ‘petty daily cares and little desires’ can be preoccupying. In democracies, the lack of interest in political matters is illustrated by low participation in elections, and by surveys indicating extremely meager knowledge of political issues and public figures. Even if they are convinced that alien rule is illegitimate, therefore, the issue may not generate enough enthusiasm by the apolitical segment of a minority to motivate it to join the national movement’s ranks.

(5) *Political and Cultural Isolation*: The intensity of the urge to cast off a foreign yoke is influenced by the degree to which the yoke is felt. For the notion that alien rule is illegitimate rule to trigger action, it is necessary that the alien rule be perceived. Multinational, non-integrated states (such as pre-World War II Ethiopia, Iran, and Thailand) were able to survive for generations without ethnationally inspired separatist movements because political and social control by the centre was a fiction. In effect, such units were comprised of a series of ethnocracies, as each group (or subgroup) ruled itself. But as communications and transportation networks made the presence of (a) the central government and (b) the dominant ethnic group felt in the periphery, ethnonational discord rose precipitously. So too, Basque, Breton, and Scottish nationalist movements gained strength as improved communication- and transportation-networks made the central government an increasingly pervasive force, and also led to an increase in the quality and quantity of contacts between the dominant group and the national minorities. A particular irritant to minority sensibilities (and, therefore, a catalyst for separatist sentiment) proved to be the increased presence of non-members of the minority within the homeland. In general, separatism has risen with in-migration. However, perception of the alien presence will vary among individuals. With a larger homeland, such as Quebec (or Scotland), some, because of their occupation, neighborhood, and/or reading and listening interests, will necessarily be more sensitized to the alien yoke than others. To these others, Ottawa and the Anglophones (or London and the English) will be too remote to their experience to ignite the fires of separatism.

(6) *Disorganization*: A resistance movement requires poles or foci about which to form and develop. A state which can atomize its population decreases the likelihood of effective antistate activity. Some states, through secret informers and infiltrators of social organizations (unions, churches, organized sports, and even the family) have proven adroit at isolating the individual. A leading Chinese composer and musician rendered this account concerning controls in the People’s Republic during the Cultural Revolution:

I was cautious about discussing such matters. Everybody and anybody could be attacked. I know many others felt as I did . . . but it was increasingly dangerous to admit it. There were party members who kept their membership secret. Even within one’s own family it was necessary to be circumspect. I trusted my wife and children, but I knew individuals whose children reported on them; Youth League members were required to do this. It happened to the father of one of my daughter’s schoolmates. Therefore, in some families,

especially if the children were 'progressive' and were trying to 'draw a line' (as the expression goes) between their parents and themselves, the adults stopped talking or changed the subject whenever the children entered. It was not uncommon for families to eat meals in silence for weeks at a time.⁶⁷

In such societies, the odds of mounting a challenge to the state are slight indeed. But even in a democracy, a peaceful national movement may encounter problems. For example, the incarceration and expulsion of Breton leaders for purported collaboration with the Nazi occupiers impeded the Breton national movement for some years after the war. The state's control of the communications media may also inhibit a movement's ability to present its side of the issue. In early 1977, Canadian political leaders accused a number of CBC announcers on the French network of favoring the *Parti Québécois*. Apparently the former did not believe that secession merited 'equal time.'

A mélange of fear, habit, inertia, apoliticalness, political and cultural isolation, disorganization, and other overlooked factors may therefore help to account for a people's passive willingness to abide within a political system to which they do not ascribe legitimacy. And, from the perspective of the state apparatus, perhaps passivity is enough. Thus, for decades the British pursued a policy of buying the passivity but not the allegiance of the Pushtun tribes within northwestern British India, and Pakistan has continued the policy. Authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and other Western European states have wanted no more than passivity from their large guestworker communities; policies have been pursued that purposefully dissuade the guestworkers from developing an emotional attachment to the state. Only passivity, not legitimacy, is essential to the everyday, humdrum functioning of a society. But if the state requires more than passivity, if it hopes to invoke the symbols of the state as a means of gaining positive cooperation and sacrifice, legitimacy will be sorely missed. Simply because one person will not raise a hand against another does not mean that he would raise a hand to aid him.

By way of summary

Three major themes emerge from this discussion of nationalism:

- (1) It is necessary to distinguish three levels of legitimacy: regime-, government-, and state-. The relationship of state-legitimacy to the other two classifications is that of the whole to its parts. To deny legitimacy to a regime is not necessarily to deny it to the government nor to the state. To deny legitimacy to a government is to deny it to the regime currently in power, but not necessarily to the state. To deny legitimacy to a state is to deny it to its government and to its present incumbents as well.
- (2) National self-determination, as a variant of popular sovereignty and its most infectious form, represents an assertive theory of state-legitimacy.
- (3) Legitimacy is not needed for a state to function, which helps to account for the durability of the multinational state well into the national era. However, as

attested by the rapid growth in the number of challenges launched against multinational states by nationally inspired forces, the revolutionary potential of the notion that alien rule is illegitimate rule is far from spent.

Notes

- 1 *Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (1939: xvi–xx).
- 2 For additional comments on the imprecision surrounding *nation*, *state*, *nation-state*, and *nationalism*, see Walker Connor (1978: 376–400).
- 3 George Theodorson and Achilles Theodorson (1969: 135).
- 4 Max Weber, *Economy and Society* I (1968: 389).
- 5 Weber (1968: 395).
- 6 Shibutani and Kwan (1965: 47).
- 7 Deutsch (1969: 3).
- 8 For numerous illustrations of people at various levels of emerging awareness, particularly within southwest Asia, see Connor (1976: 9–25).
- 9 Popularization of the ‘principle of nationalities’ was assured when Napoleon III publicly embraced it as an official aspect of his foreign policy. See, for example, Redslob (1930), particularly pp. 28 *et seq.* See also Johannet (1923), particularly chapter 9, ‘Le principe des nationalités au pouvoir.’ It is generally believed that Marx and/or Engels coined the expression ‘national self-determination’. For details, see Connor (forthcoming). However, popularity of the expression awaited its embrace by Woodrow Wilson during World War I.
- 10 After justifying its annexation of West Irian by conducting a questionable testing of popular sentiment in that region in 1969, the Indonesian government did not go even that far in justifying its annexation of Eastern Timor during 1976. Rather, having assured this new annexation by sending units of ‘volunteers’ from the Indonesian army, it justified this military intrusion as a means of guaranteeing ‘the proper, orderly and peaceful exercise of the right of self-determination of the Portuguese Timor people.’ See *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, p. 27535.
- 11 A classical illustration is offered by the Pakistani authorities who, throughout the secessionist struggle in East Pakistan during 1971, regularly referred to the Bengali guerrillas as a few ‘miscreants’ or ‘Indian agents’. See, for example, *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, p. 24989.
- 12 Admittedly, the constitutions of many multinational states do implicitly deny the right of secession by references to an enduring union of peoples, by references to the entire territory as inalienable or inseparable, and by proscribing treason or other anti-state activities. But none explicitly deny the right of national self-determination. Indeed, some constitutions (for example, those of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) contain references both to the right of national self-determination and to the unquestionable, permanent nature of the present political structure.
- 13 The early response of the Canadian federal government to the victory of the separatist-minded Parti Québécois in the provincial election of 1976 offers an interesting case study. Though explicitly neither denying nor admitting the right of Québécois to secede, the Canadian Prime Minister insisted that ‘Québec does not believe in separatism.’ (Television address, 24 November 1976.) Federal government spokesmen suggested that, even if an affirmative referendum on secession were held in Québec, it would require federal endorsement and United Kingdom approval. All such statements constitute an *implicit* rejection of the primacy of the self-determination principle.
- 14 John Wahlke, ‘The Language and Methods of Political Science’, in Wahlke and Dragnich (eds) (1966).

- 15 The surprising lack of academic effort engendered by political legitimacy is evidenced by the absence of any such entry in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1933), which was an attempt to set forth, *inter alia*, all of the important topics of social science research. The updated version of this attempt (*The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 1968), contains only an abbreviated discussion of the issue, and its sparse bibliography further attests to the paucity of literature. The bibliography contains not a single book written in English, with the word legitimacy in its title. The only two titles referring specifically to legitimacy are both in German, were published in 1866 and 1932 respectively, and were each addressed to a narrow application of the concept. The clear implication is that no contemporary scholarship on the topic exists.
- 16 To the reader who wishes to confirm this statement by consulting tables of contents and subject indices of the leading analysts of political philosophy, pertinent entries may include *authority* (often used in contradistinction to naked coercion), *consent*, *legitimacy*, *dynastic legitimacy*, *political legitimacy*, *obligation*, and *political obligation*. One explanation for the failure of contemporary theorists to address the matter of legitimacy is suggested by Anthony de Crespigny (in de Crespigny and Alan Wertheimer (1972: 7). He notes that political theory has come under attack from modern political scientists who maintain the 'spuriousness' of such 'central questions of classical political philosophy' as 'Why ought a subject obey his ruler?' or 'Why should I support *any* government?' The critics of classical political theory contend that such questions are too 'general to be answerable'.
- 17 One can consult without success Plano and Greenberg (1967); Plano and Olton (1969); Elliott and Summerskill (1966); Laqueur (ed.) (1973); A. M. Hymason (1974); Hermanson (1967); and Cranston and Lakoff (n.d.).
- 18 Those consulted included James Baldwin (ed.) (1957), 3 vols; Burger and Baker (1974); and Grooter and Seenberger (1967), 8 vols, which carried thirty-one sub-entries under *Political Philosophy, Nature of*, including such legitimacy-related items as *contract theory*, *sovereignty*, *state*, and *nationalism*.
- 19 An entry under legitimacy was found in *Encyclopedia of Sociology* (1974); in Hault (1969); and in Gould and Kolb (1964). A pertinent entry under authority was found in Theodorson and Theodorson (1969). Pertinent entries were not located in John Zdrozny (1959); in Mitchell (1968); nor in Fairchild (1944).
- 20 Max Weber (1968), 3 vols. See particularly the sections entitled 'Legitimate Order', 'Types of Legitimate Order: Convention and Law', and 'Bases of Legitimacy: Tradition, Faith, Enactment', 1, 31–38.
- 21 Such a possibility is lent credence by the fact that many of the professional dictionaries and encyclopedias, though not deigning to define the expression, make use of it when explaining related phenomena. For example, Zdrozny (1959) defined *popular sovereignty* as 'the idea that the people who are governed are the only legitimate source of political power and authority'. Theodorson (1969) defines *authority* as 'power that is legitimized and institutionalized in a society or other social system'. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* notes that one view of nationalism holds 'that states are legitimate only if constituted in accordance with this principle'. We have also noted that scholars (including Weber) employ the term without feeling compelled to define it.
- 22 For example, although post-Salazar Portugal became the scene of bitter and often violent struggle between factions representing nearly every shade of political opinion from radical left to radical right, and although the struggle concerned not just who should rule but also the ideology and form of government to be introduced, the right of the state of Portugal to exist was not challenged by any of the forces operating within continental Portugal. In light of the following discussion, it is worth observing that Portugal is one of the world's few ethnically homogeneous states. By contrast with Portugal, the militant movements in Iran during 1978–79, that culminated in the downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty, represented a challenge to governmental legitimacy so far as Persian participants were concerned (regardless of whether the Persians were Islamic rightists

- or radical leftists), but a challenge to state-legitimacy by Arab, Azerbaidzhani, Baluchi, Kurdish, and Turkmen militants.
- 23 The schematic is also unconcerned with the degree of violence involved in the political activity. Palace revolutions, coups d'état, political revolutions, and secessionist movements have all been known to be conducted by peaceful means.
- 24 Four of the more deservedly influential treatises on legitimacy have been those by Max Weber, David Easton, Leslie Lipson, and Seymour Lipset. Though Weber raised the important state-legitimacy issue of communal (*Vergemeinschaftung*) versus associative (*Vergesellschaftung*) relationships (Weber 1968: 40–43), as well as offering an insightful section on ethnic groups and nations (pp. 385–398), he does not link these discussions to his extended discourse on regime- and governmental-legitimacy. Thus, though he differentiates among what he terms charismatic, traditional, and legal legitimacy, all of these clearly pertain to regimes and governments, but not to states. Though Easton's notion of authority (by which he means legitimacy) is potentially applicable to state-legitimacy, his total discussion makes evident that he also has regime- and governmental-legitimacy in mind. See Easton (1971), particularly pp. 129 et seq. Similar comments pertain to Leslie Lipson's notion of authority. See Lipson (1970): 75 et seq. Similarly, although Lipset's definition of legitimacy as 'the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society' could quite evidently pertain to the notion of state-legitimacy, his subsequent discourse reveals that he was thinking solely of regime- and/or governmental-legitimacy. See Lipset (1960), particularly Chapter 3. Robert Dahl's treatment of political legitimacy is also confined to regime- or, at best, governmental-legitimacy. See Dahl (1976), particular pp. 61 et seq.
- 25 Machiavelli's final chapter of *The Prince*, written in 1513, might be viewed as a harbinger of the notion of national self-determination. There are, however, several elements which caution against too affirmative a judgment: (1) the chapter's theme of national liberation does not accord with the previous twenty-five chapters; (2) the case for the liberation of Italy is made more upon oppression and misrule by foreigners than upon a positive right of self-determination, and it therefore harmonizes with the medieval notion of the right to overthrow a tyrannical government (a right devoid of national considerations); (3) Italy then was even more truly 'only a geographic expression' than it would be three hundred years later, when so described by Metternich. With regard to the last point, it is questionable even today whether the sense of a single Italian national consciousness permeates the population of Italy. For further discussion, see this writer's 'The Political Significance of Ethnonationalism within Western Europe', in Connor (1976), particularly pp. 126 et seq. In any event, Machiavelli's comments on Italian liberation constituted at most an early suggestion of the idea of national self-determination rather than a developed discourse. As such, it held no discernible significance for the subsequent growth of the national idea, despite the great impact that other facets of *The Prince* have exerted upon political thought and practice. In the decades immediately prior to the French Revolution, Johann von Herder wrote extensively concerning the importance of the nation. However, his ruminations were restricted to the cultural sphere, and he did not anticipate any need for nation-states.
- 26 Here, the term state means the primary political unit of its day, a unit which has, of course, undergone significant alterations over the ages. To the Greek philosophers the unit was the *polis*; to Roman philosophers, the empire; and to modern writers, the *state*.
- 27 *The Nicomachean Ethics*, transl. J. A. K. Thomson (1955: 44). Though the *raison d'être* assigned by Aristotle to the *polis* was unrelated to the ethnic composition of its citizenry, he was not without ethnocentric impulses, nor unaware of possible problems arising from ethnic heterogeneity. In Book VII of his *Politics*, he boasted about the virtues of 'the Hellenic race', and opined that 'if it could be formed into one state, it would be able to rule the world'. In Book V of the same work, he noted that the presence of unassimilated peoples within a single polity tends to produce revolution. See *Politics* (1943: 216 and 291).

- 28 For an intellectual debate concerning whether Georg Hegel should be included on this list, see Walter Kaufmann (1970). The debate is put into particularly sharp focus by the contributions of Sidney Hook and Shlomo Avineri.
- 29 Merriam (1900: 12). The inner quotation is by the German scholar, Otto Gierke.
- 30 de Maistre 'Considerations on France', in *The Works of Joseph de Maistre* (n.d.: 80).
- 31 Richard Andrews, in a review of Michael Walzer, *Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI*, in *The New York Times Book Review*, 9 June 1974.
- 32 The notion of *l'état c'est moi* points up a major reason why earlier theories of state legitimacy were indistinguishable from theories of regime- and government-legitimacy, and are, as a result, of little relevance to the issue of state-legitimacy in the era of popular sovereignty. When the state is identified with a single person (a monarch or a traditional, pre-Napoleonic emperor) or with a royal élite (an aristocracy), regime-, government-, and state-legitimacy blur into a single whole. But with sovereignty vested in the people, state-legitimacy stands aloof.
- 33 See 'Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?'. In Renan (1887: 276–310).
- 34 Renan ostensibly discoursed on his notion of *the nation*, not *the state*. But, in fact, his speech, which aimed at convincing German-speaking Alsatians to remain loyal to France, was a defense of the legitimacy of the multinational state.
- 35 Geographic distance, as used here, refers to communications-distance and psychological distance. Such concepts of distance are influenced by the level of communications technology, and are not to be equated with physical distance. For further discussion of types of distance, see Connor 'Myths of Hemispheric, Continental, Regional and State Unity', *Political Science Quarterly*, 84 (1969: 555–582).
- 36 But contrast the emotional content of the public utterances voiced in the name of a nationalist movement with the more reasoned arguments of a regional movement. While both customarily utilize such rational devices as the economic advantages which will accompany secession, the former will add such emotion-laden expressions as 'preservation of our chasteness from perverting, outside influences', 'the need to be masters in our own house' (or 'of the nation's destiny'), and the like.
- 37 Canada is only partly an immigrant society, being partly a multinational state. It faced both regional secession and, in the case of the Québécois, ethnonational secession. The problem confronting Ottawa in establishing its identity vis-à-vis the *popular* popular sovereignty of the Québécois has been nicely captured by Alan Cairns (1979: 23): 'The capacity of the federal government to maintain its legitimacy was weakened by the relatively underdeveloped sense of Canadian patriotism in the country as a whole. In conflict with a strong sense of nationality based on a living historically based primordial sense of nationalism, the potential of the centre rests on the inherently weaker sense of civic identity and the abstract conception of citizenship on which it can base its legitimacy.'
- 38 As to the three exceptions: one (Portugal) had accidentally entered the post-Napoleonic era as an ethnically homogeneous state, and the other two (Spain and Switzerland) had not been immune to ethnonational stirrings during the period.
- 39 Its growing impact was apparent, however, even before World War I, among the Japanese, Chinese, Armenians, and Levantine Arabs.
- 40 Otherwise, the same demands would not have surfaced both in the Rhodesias (ruled as overseas colonies) and in the Republic of South Africa (ruled from within).
- 41 For details, see Connor 'Self-Determination: The New Phase', *World Politics*, 20 (1967: 30–35); 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying', *World Politics*, 24 (1972: 319–355).
- 42 A list of troubled states as of 1972 may be found in Connor 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', *Journal of International Affairs*, 27 (No. 1 1973: 21).
- 43 For a tracing of this historical unraveling, see *ibid.*, 5–11.
- 44 At the end of World War I, for example, many Slovak leaders believed themselves to be Czechs, and the 1918 Constitution of the newly 'self-determined' state declared the existence of a single 'Czechoslovak nation.' Similarly, doubts arose concerning the

national identity of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The official position of the new Yugoslav state was that they were merely tribal segments of a single Yugoslav nation. Needless to say, national consciousness has subsequently definitely emerged among all four of these peoples.

- 45 For a detailed discussion of a number of such catalysts and soporifics, with particular regard to the experience of Western Europe, Connor 'Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Perspective', in Milton Esman (ed.) *Ethnic Pluralism and Conflict in the Western World* (Ithaca: 1977): 19–45.
- 46 The very slow pace of the emergence of the Byelorussians is a case in point. Poles, Germans, and Russians have taken turns over the decades at decimating their leaders. For details, see Lubachko (1972). Despite the title, this history goes well back beyond 1917.
- 47 A desire for a period of quiet and a general coolness toward nationalism may be detected immediately after the Napoleonic Wars and the struggles of 1848. The most striking case, however, is that of Europe in the post-World War II period following the defeat of a fanatical movement whose major impulse was German ethnonationalism.
- 48 *Message to the Senate* (1804), reprinted in Herold (1955: 72).
- 49 A rule-proving exception to this trend occurred in 1976, when the former Central African Republic was declared to be the Central African Empire by its leader who changed his title of 'President-for-life' to 'Emperor Bokassa I'. However, some lip-service to popular sovereignty was maintained when the new state was described as a constitutional monarchy. Bokassa was overthrown and the Republic restored in 1979. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 28172.
- 50 The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 was another milepost in this process. The remaining exceptions are Nepal and a number of dynastic houses within the Arab world. The latter's claims to legitimacy rest in part on purported descent from the Prophet.
- 51 *Declaration of the Armed Forces Committee*, July 18, 1974. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 26733.
- 52 Article 3 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936. The fact that this constitution is popularly referred to as 'the Stalin Constitution' underlines the immense discrepancy between form and substance.
- 53 See Brinkley (1973: 387–401).
- 54 However, this did not prevent the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, searching for issues in their polemics with Moscow, from criticizing Khrushchev's terminology on narrow, doctrinaire, though technically correct grounds:

In the view of Marxists–Leninists, there is no such thing as a non-class or supra-class state. So long as the state remains a state, it must bear a class character: so long as the state exists, it cannot be a state of the 'whole people'. As soon as society becomes classless, there will no longer be a state. Then what sort of thing would a 'state of the whole people' be? Anyone with an elementary knowledge of Marxism–Leninism can understand that the so-called state of the whole people is nothing new. Representative bourgeois figures have always called the bourgeois state a 'state of all the people', or a 'state in which power belongs to all the people.' Certain persons may say that their society is already one without classes. We answer: No, there are classes and class struggles in all Socialist countries without exception.

(*Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party July 1963*, reprinted in Henry Christman (ed.), *Communism in Action: A Documentary History* (New York, 1969): 260–261.

- 55 'Experience shows that the *framing of a future, in some indeterminate time*, may when it is done in a certain way, be very effective, and have very few inconveniences: this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths which enclose within them all the strongest inclinations of a people. . . ' Sorel (1950: 134).

- 56 Some of the more tangible forms that this lip-service takes include one-party or otherwise farcical elections; office titles borrowed from democracies, such as *president* or *premier*; and extremely democratic-sounding constitutions.
- 57 *Considerations on Representative Government*, originally published in 1861. The citation may be found in the 1973 edition by Henry Holt and Company, p. 310.
- 58 Barker (1927: 17).
- 59 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', *op. cit.*, particularly Part IV: 11–18.
- 60 See, for example, Dahl (1976: 61). A few authorities have cogently noted that, in pre-modern societies, the matter of legitimacy among remote segments of the populace may not arise, because the state is not a pervasive reality in their lives. In extreme cases, ostensible subjects of a state may be unaware of the existence of the state to which mapmakers have assigned them.
- 61 Terchek (1977: 49).
- 62 *The New York Times*, 8 December 1978. Slightly more than 70 percent of the electorate in the Basque provinces either abstained (as requested by the Basque Nationalist Party), or voted negatively. Given the large number of non-Basques who, in recent decades, have immigrated to this region in search of employment, it may be safely assumed that the percentage of abstentions and no votes among the Basques was substantially higher than the 70 percent figure.
- 63 The speaker was Ludvik Vaculik. His speech is excerpted in Steiner (1973: 147). Parenthetical material has been added. Though Vaculik refers specifically to governmental legitimacy, his comments would be equally applicable to state-legitimacy.
- 64 Aristotle *Politics* (11: 107).
- 65 Weber I (1968: 319–321). Dahl (1976: 44–50) uses the phrase 'trained control' in referring to habit. Rose (1978: 29) has noted: 'Ordinary people do not require a rationale for political allegiance: what Bagehot called the "cake of custom" can suffice.'
- 66 *Comfortableness* need not imply contentedness. *The familiar*, as contrasted with the new, may simply be judged the lesser gamble.
- 67 'Interview with Ma Sitson', *Life* (4 July 1967).

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