Dedicated to Sudan Airways pilot
Giorgis Yustus, who was executed in February 1991 for contravention
of a currency law that was removed from the Sudanese statute books
less than a year later.
The Sudanese Copts are a small
but prominent minority 500,000 who have lived in Sudan for more
than one hundred years. They have significant communities in urban
towns in the northern provinces, especially Dongala, Atbara, the
capital Khartoum and Omdurman, Wad Medani, Port Sudan, and al-Obeid,
served by twenty three churches and two bishops. They are now
threatened by an Islamic fundamentalist government that seems
determined to drive them out of their country. They are subjected
to a wide range of discriminatory practices.
Copts are the followers of the
Egyptian Coptic Orthodox church, the largest Christian group in
the Middle East. It was founded in the first century in Alexandria
(Egypt), and now has the lion's share of followers among the Christians
of Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Northern Sudan. Christianity was introduced
South to Upper Egypt,
Northern Sudan, and then to
Ethiopia in the first definite missionary endeavor of the Church
of Egypt and was the first contact Christianity had with black
Africa. However after the collapse of the Christian Kingdoms of
Northern Sudan, the Coptic communities disappeared. Christianity
was revived in Sudan by the arrival of Coptic immigrants from
Egypt to the Sudan, in waves of refugees triggered by bouts of
oppression from Moslem rulers of Egypt. The peak of that movement
was reached after the Turco-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan in
1821. These Coptic immigrants came as civil servants, craftsmen,
and merchants, for whom Sudan became the land of opportunity and
tolerance. After the Mahdi seized power in 1885, however, they
were left with no choice but to convert to Islam. Only those who
managed to escape from the country succeeded in keeping their
faith.
The Copts returned to Sudan
once more after the Anglo-Egyptian troops conquered the Mahdist
State ( 1885-1898). Some of those who converted to Islam returned
to Christianity, but some could not, in view of the complications
of intermarriage. They lived in peace and harmony with other groups
in the society, and were prominent in trading, banking, engineering,
and the medical profession, but avoided political involvement.
Their political concerns were awakened in the 1960s when the issue
of an Islamic constitution began to dominate Sudanese political
life. Coptic community representatives joined the public opposition
to the proposed Islamic constitution and voiced strong protest,
highlighting for the first time the determination of their community
to play an active role in shaping the future constitution of the
country. The May 1969 military intervention under Nimeiri, and
the sidelining of the Islamic question, was a great relief to
the Copts, whose community leaders publicly welcomed the change.
In the early 1970s a Copt who was one of the top civil servants
was appointed as a senior minister, and in the mid-seventies the
government donated money and freehold land (13,300 square meters)
to build Coptic clubs in Khartoum and Omdurman.
A few years later, however,
Sudan witnessed the increasing Islamisation of the Nimeiri regime,
which culminated in the implementation of "Sharia" (Islamic
law) in 1983. Islamic law by its very nature relegates non-Moslems
to second class status. At first discrimination against Copts
was limited, until the current regime, headed by General Omer
Hassan al-Bashir, seized power in June 1989 in alliance with the
National Islamic Front. The outrages against the Coptic community
then began in earnest, although the regime denies this and the
international community has been preoccupied with the ordeals
of minorities elsewhere.
The Copts cannot escape to Egypt
this time, as most of them have been born in Sudan and no longer
have connections in Egypt. The greater obstacle to flight, however,
is the growth of Islamic absolutism in Egypt, with its encouragement
of sectarian hatred and violence. Public harassment of Copts and
the refusal to allow them to perform their religious rituals or
celebrate social events have become common in many cities in Upper
Egypt. Twelve Christians were killed in Egypt in an attack by
Islamists in May 1992. In the same year a bus was attacked and
five Copts were killed, and a Coptic physician was murdered in
his clinic.
Facing such dangers, and the
fact that Egypt and Sudan do not officially recognize refugees
from each other's countries, Copts now face a dilemma over asylum.
Some Sudanese Copts' applications for asylum have been rejected
in Germany and Canada, and they are left with no option. The days
are gone when Coptic monks used to hide in the desert monasteries:
even the desert is no longer a safe hiding place.
Egypt was one of the first nations
to adopt Christianity, and the history of the Coptic church goes
back to the first division in the Christian Church.
Facing hostility from the Catholic Church in Rome, the Coptic priests were obliged to escape to the desert to maintain their faith. Persecution from this quarter ended with the Islamic invasion of Egypt in the seventh century, when Coptic Christians were at least allowed second class citizenship: their status was reduced to that of "Dhimma". This codified system of legal duties and obligations was introduced by the Khalifa Omar, the second Khalifa in Islam, and regulated the treatment of the non Moslem indigenous population. The code dictates that:
(1) The Dhimma should pay a regular fee in order to keep their religion.
(2) They should not prevent any Christian from converting to Islam, and should not
attempt to convert any Moslem to their be1ief.
(3) They should not hold any pub1ic post that would give them any authority over
Moslems.
(4) They should not sell their books or crosses in the markets.
(5) They should not raise the sound of their church bells or raise their own voices in
front of Moslems.
(6) They must walk on the edge of the street, and leave the middle to the Moslems.
It is significant that some Copts worked as clerk5 in the Islamic administration due
to the shortage of literate and numerate people, but they suffered from the many
disadvantages inherent in the code.
The last phases of the Ottoman empire saw some improvement in the condition of the
non-Moslems after the legal reform made by Emperor Suliman the Great, but the most
important change for the Copts began after Mohammed Ali, the Khedive of Egypt (1801-
46) introduced
some French laws into the consulate courts.
In 1882 Egypt became a British
Protectorate. Judicial reform was introduced by Lord Cromer in
1883 and Egypt became a secular state. Nevertheless some of the
Islamic or - more precisely - Ottoman laws have remained in the
Egyptian legal system. The most notorious is the "Hamayony
Khat" issued in 1856, a rule which prevents the building
of new churches or repairing of old ones without a presidential
decree. The absurdity of this was illustrated in 1991 when the
Egyptian newspapers published a presidential decree following
the mending of toilets in two churches.
The current UN Secretary General
Boutros Boutros Ghali was never permitted to hold the full title
of Foreign Minister of Egypt, and was appointed acting Foreign
Minister for only a few months after the Camp David agreement.
He was later demoted to State Minister in the Foreign Affairs
Ministry when a more suitable Moslem was found to fill the post.
A man who is qualified to be the Secretary General of the UN is
not entitled to be a foreign minister in his own country because
of his religion.
Sudanese Copts had partially
escaped that fate. The law codes in force between 1900 and 1983
awarded equal rights to followers of all religions. The Copts
were able to live peacefully and without prejudice by virtue of
the tolerance of Sudan's laws and the people's attitudes. In fact,
the Copts were always considered as a prestigious minority as
result of their proficiency in business and administration as
well as their good social and financial status. Additionally,
the Copts benefited from having light colored skin among a population
that was trying hard to distance itself from the blacks. For all
these reasons Sudan was a much better place for them than Egypt.
The Copts became % integrated into Sudanese society in every respect
but marriage. They were given the name Nagada - after a village
in southern Egypt to which some Sudanese Copts originally belonged
- as a label which equated them with the Sudanese tribes.
In September 1983, shortly after
a strike by Sudanese judges, the then President Nimeri surprised
Sudan by issuing a new set of supposedly "Islamic" laws,
guided by members of what is now the National Islamic Front. These
laws included the Penal Code, Criminal Procedures, Traffic Act,
Civil Procedures, and the Law of Evidence. They were followed
by the Sources of the Judicial Rules Act, and the Civil Transactions
Act. Nimeri's move did not merely assert Islam as the state religion,
but started to create a religious state built on the Koranic Code,
whose principles would dominate all aspects of life. Non-Muslims
would have a place in Sudan, but a subordinate one, and should
be subjugated. The Sources of Judicial Rules Act gave the interpretation
of
"Sharia" as the principal
source of the law, and together with a section in the Penal Code
this interpretation made it possible for the judges to sentence
defendants for crimes which had not existed in the written codes
when the alleged crime was committed. Given the prejudices and
absolutist motivation of the newly appointed Islamic judges, this
led to clear violations of human rights.
The first abuses of this free
interpretation occurred when men who worked as women's hairdressers
were sentenced to fines and flogging. The second occurred when
the leader of the Republican Brothers, Ustaz Mahmoud Mohamed Taha,
was executed in January 1985 for the alleged crime of Ridda (apostasy).
The exercise led to an era of chaos and anarchy. No one felt safe
with "laws" that undermined the rule of law, and "emergency
courts" which were themselves in contempt of justice.
The Copts had reason to feel
unsafe and victimized. After the declaration of the September
Penal Code, alcoholic drinks (valued at around 10 million dollars)
were confiscated and destroyed the following day. It was not clear
whether the government was going to compensate the traders or
not. The majority of the alcohol traders were non-Moslems and
a significant number of them were Copts.
The Law of Evidence of 1983
determined that the testimony of non-Moslems was not admissible
in certain "hudud" crimes, even if a non-Moslem was
involved in the trial. A Roman Catholic priest was flogged for
possessing communion wine. Although the priest was not a Copt,
the incident offended and frightened them. Moreover, an application
for building a church in an existing Christian cemetery was rejected.
Although they provided a catalyst
for the 1985 popular uprising, the September Laws remained in
place after the fall of Nimeiri, both under the transitional government
and the elected Parliament ( 1986-89) - but the use of amputation
and capital punishment was suspended. During this period, the
Sudanese Copts became more aware of the effect of politics on
their rights as a minority. They formed the "Christian Alliance",
a pressure group to lobby for the rights and interests of Christians
of all dominations. They participated zealously in the campaign
against the Islamists' proposed "amendments" to the
September Laws. For the first time they tried to influence the
1986 general election, voting for the secular candidates and campaigning
against the National Islamic Front (NIF) programme for a religious
state. This provided the fundamentalists with added incentives
to eradicate them. The newspapers of the NIF wrote angrily about
an alleged coalition between the Communists and Christians aiming
to undermine the will of the Moslem community (although the Moslem
community was itself divided over the imposition of Sharia), and
whipped up public fears by labeling them as "fifth columnists".
Pro-NIF businessmen began a coordinated effort to encourage the
Copts to leave the country, and offered them twice the market
value of their real estate.
Under the current Bashir regime,
what had hitherto been considered as isolated incidents or merely
theoretical assumptions became state policy. Hundreds of Copts
were dismissed from the civil service and the judiciary, simply
because they were Christians. Mr Justice Henry Riad was dismissed
from the Supreme Court. He lost his position despite the fact
that he had opposed on procedural grounds an appeal to consider
Ustaz Mahmoud Mohamed Taha's 1985 trial null and void. The case
was brought by Taha's daughter and a second accused of apostasy,
to protect their constitutional rights in November 1986. Justice
Raid's stance was seen at that time by the public, irrespective
of his real motives, as support to the NIF.
By September 1990 more than
30 churches, set up by different denominations to serve the displaced
people around Khartoum and Omdurman were closed. In al-Obeid and
al-Nahud in Western Sudan two churches were closed and some of
their staff were deported by the authorities.
In their 1992 letter to the
Secretary General of the UN, the General Secretariat of the Sudan
Catholic Bishops' Conference confirmed that job applicants in
Sudan are required to produce a legal testimonial that they are
Moslems. They also said that they knew of two young Christian
men who failed to obtain an interview because of these requirements.
The Coptic community
was deeply shocked by the execution, after a summary trial, of
airline pilot Giorgis Yustus in 1991. Although ostensibly concerning
only a single individual, this act was clearly aimed at frightening
the Coptic community, and it succeeded in doing so. Giorgis, a
Sudan Airways pilot and the son of a Coptic priest, was convicted
of possessing foreign currency under the Currency Restriction
Act then in force, which carried the death penalty. (In 1992 the
government lifted all restrictions on possessing and dealing in
foreign currency.) Although two Moslems were also executed for
the same alleged crime, there were clear indications that religious
prejudice was involved in Giorgis' case. The government-controlled
media insisted on referring to him as "Giorgis, the son of
Yustus the priest". Giorgis was informally offered a pardon
and money if he converted to Islam, an offer which he refused.
Those who visited him during the trial, including some of his
Sudan Airways colleagues, say Giorgis remained steadfast to the
end. When he was executed in February 1991, thousands of people,
Moslems as well as Copts, attended Giorgis's funeral in a clear
demonstration of protest and solidarity.
The Giorgis case prompted a
new exodus of the Copts from Sudan, who felt that a secret and
subtle war had been launched against them. They came under attack
from new rules on nationality, education, military and para-military
recruitment, as well as restraints on Coptic businessmen and a
media war.
Nationality questions in Sudan
are decided by the Nationality Act of 1957, which specifies two
types of nationality: one by birth and the other by naturalisation.
Many Copts obtained Sudanese
nationality by naturalisation, and their children who were born
after that were entitled to nationality by birth. Until recent
years it was generaily easy for Copts to obtain either kind of
rationality, but this has now changed. Recently, when a Coptic
woman, married to a Sudanese Copt for thirty years, applied for
Sudanese nationality by naturalisation, the application was refused.
The Egyptian Consulate in Khartoum could not issue her a passport
because they did not have her records, and consequently she was
not able to travel abroad for medical treatment.
The dilemma for the government
is that its wish to drive the Copts out of the country is contradicted
by its nationality policy, because Copts need nationality papers
in order to obtain a travel document. A solution has been found
by unofficially instructing nationality officials not to award
any Copt nationality by birth: those Copts who were eligible for
Sudanese nationality by birth were given naturalisation instead.
A motivating factor in this decision is that a naturalised Sudanese
loses his nationality if he remains absent from the country for
a certain number of years.
Sudan's Arabic language and
history syllabuses have now become Islamic studies, and school
songs have been changed to Islamic absolutist anthems in praise
of "Jihad" (Holy War) and martyrdom. Christian children
face constant harassment. Many children have had their crosses
snatched from their necks, and a Coptic child was savagely flogged
because he failed to recite a verse from the Koran, which children
are obliged to learn by heart. Schoolgirls are forced to wear
Islamic dress, an issue which goes beyond the confines of educational
institutes. On l9th December 1991, a residential decree was announced
in the government newspaper "Al-Sudan Al-Hadith" newspaper
by the Wali (governor) of Khartoum, requiring women to wear Islamic
dress on grounds of "modesty". Governors- in other states
subsequently did the same. Copts have always dressed modestly:
the problem is that what should be a personal matter has been
decided for them by others, based on the teachings of another
religion.
In the institutes of higher
education, two "Institutes for the Islamisation of Knowledge"
were set up in 1991; one in Khartoum and the other within the
University of Gezira. The aim of these institutes is to ensure
that all knowledge and learning emanates from "Islamic Principles".
This presumably includes the natural sciences. The authorities
have already introduced doctrinaire subjects like "Islamic
Economics" and "Islamic Accounting", and have suggested
dropping the Hippocratic Oath at the Faculty of Medicine. The
idea of Islamisation of knowledge is at odds with academic freedom
because it excludes the contributions of Sudanese Christians,
animists and secular Moslems, and rejects the common human heritage
and the free exchange which enrich all cultures. This concept
of Islamisation is applied to all public higher education institutes.
At present the only important difference between these institutes
and the Islamic University of Omdurman is that the latter does
not accept non-Moslem applicants, even in faculties such as law,
journalism or medicine.
The Copts have been conscripted
into the army and the Popular Defence Force (PDF) militias, a
cynical move at a time when the government is fighting a war against
the south of the country in the name of "Jihad", or
Islamic Holy War. The majority of the population in the South
are non-Moslems, and a substantial number of them are Christians,
so the Christian Copts are in fact obliged to fight a holy war
against Christianity. Young Copts are summoned for compulsory
military service, while older Copts in the civil service are summoned
to train for the Popular Defence Force.
Africa Watch has obtained the
testimony of a Copt who was conscripted into one of the PDF camps.
His name and other personal details are omitted for security reasons:
"I am 46 years old, married
with children. I was summoned from my workplace to the PDF camp
in Al-Geteina. I tried to refuse on the grounds that I was 45
and diabetic, but I was told that I would lose my job if I failed
to join the PDF for any reason.
"I went to the camp at
the appointed time. There were two other Copts in the camp at
that time, along with four Christian Southerners.
'The day starts with the Moslems' dawn prayer: We must all wake up by that time. Moslems go to their prayers and we start cleaning the tents until they join us.
"We go to the showers from there, and the day's routine continues with the various exercises and training. In the evening there is a lecture in the camp's mosque, an Islamic lecture. We are obliged to attend the lectures, yet inside the mosque some of the trainees say to us, "You infidels, you have defiled the mosque!". We were asked on several occasions to convert to Islam. The request was usually made in a polite way and in friendly conversation. But given the fact that we could not make the same comparison that they make between the two religions from our own point of view, and given the whole atmosphere, the request appeared provocative and intimidating.
"The food was poor and
badly cooked. It was a problem for everybody, but nevertheless
we had our special problems in that respect as well. In Ramadan,
the Moslen' .fasting month, meal times were changed to suit those
who were fasting. There was no arrangement made for us and we
had to stay without food the whole day, until sunset. It was extremely
difficult for me because I have diabetes. During the fast for
I.ent, not only did they refuse to provide us with the required
food, but they also refused to allow us to bring it in from outside.
We were allowed a week's vacation for Easter, granted after long
and persistent requests on our part.
"At the end of the training
course we were released and told that we might be summoned for
"Jihad" in two weeks' time. I could not wait for that
summons."
The growing campaign of Islamisation
by the government is strongly manifested in the media. Television
programmes contain a large amount of Islamic propaganda; children's
programmes consist largely of Islamic education and principles.
Many Coptic children have asked their parents: "Is it true
that if you are not a Moslem you will go to Hell?"
The programmes often contain
provocative notions. In a programme about charity work called
"Kind Relations", during a visit to the women's prison,
the presenter asked an inmate: "Which is better, Islam or
Christianity?" The answer was "Islam." The presenter
then asked, "Why did you convert to Islam?" "Because
they are going to release me and they gave me money," replied
the inmate.
There is widespread coverage
of the Moslems' Friday prayers on television and radio. The coverage
of the Christian Sunday prayers which used to be allowed on the
radio has been stopped. A Coptic priest named Filosaweth Faraj
used to write a column in "A1-Sudan A1-Hadith" (Modern
Sudan) newspaper every Sunday. It was an attempt by the priest
to ease the relations between Moslems and Christians. One Sunday
he
wrote an article about the ties
and the common issues in the two religions. The following day
the paper published a comment from a reader, who stated that Christians
were "Dhimma" who should pay the "Gezia" fee
for Islamic protection. The following Sunday the Coptic priest
wrote an article about love and forgiveness in his column: then
he stopped writing.
The harassment of the Coptic
businessmen is subtle and therefore difficult to pinpoint, yet
it has a serious effect. Many Coptic businessmen fled Sudan despite
the fact that the low value of their Sudanese currency holdings
forbade the majority of them from working as businessmen in any
other country.
The government in Sudan has
always had a strong influence over business, through the control
of customs, import licences, taxes, and various local authority
licences. The Bashir government has used these controls to the
maximum benefit of pro NIF businessmen. Business transactions
are made generally difficult for any non-NIF businessman, but
the Copts suffer particular additional harassment. It is extremely
difficult for them to renew their operating licences; they often
receive visits from local authority officials to inspect their
workplaces, and the inspectors usually find reasons either to
impose fines or to close down the business.
The Sudanese Copts, along with
other ethnic and religious minorities, are facing systematic violations
of their rights. The government's claim that the Islamic state
guarantees other believers their rights is belied both by the
past history and present practices. It is insufficient to grant
a limited measure of rights on the grounds of religious law: basic
rights are an indisputable entitlement. The Copts in the Sudan
cannot complain to the international community, since the current
government has threatened that any complaint they make will further
endanger their security and businesses. The Copts' supreme religious
leader Pope Shenouda III, in Egypt, cannot speak publicly on the
matter, because of the potential backlash of Islamic absolutists
against Copts in Egypt. What can be done to stop the continuing
injustice and discrimination against a people who have lived peacefully
with Islamic compatriots for the past century?
Africa Watch calls for the removal of the discriminatory laws and practices levelled against Copts in Sudan. Specifically:
* Any discriminatory provisions
under the Penal Code of 1991, the Evidence Act of 1983 or any
other laws should be abolished.
Africa Watch is a non governmental
organization which was established in May 1988 to monitor human
rights practices in Africa and to promote respect for internationally
recognized standards. Its Chair is William Carmichael; its Vice-Chair
is Alice Brown. Its research Associates are Janet Fleischman and
Karen Sorensen; Bronwen Manby is a Schell Fellow; Abdelsalam Hassan
is a consultant and Ben Penglase, Umi Shah and Anthony Levintow
are Associates.
Africa Watch is a division
of Human Rights Watch, which also includes Americas Watch, Asia
Watch, Helsinki Watch, Middle East Watch and Fund For Free expression.
The chair of Human Rights Watch is Robert L Bemstein and the Vice-Chair
is Adrian W DeWind Aryeh Neier is Executive Director of Human
Rights Watch, the Deputy Director is Kenneth Roth; Holty J Burkhalter
is Washington Director Gara LaMarche is Associate Director and
Susan Osnos is Press Director.
After the 1989 coup that overthrew
Sudan's democratically elected government, the military assumed
power under Lt. General Omar Hassan Al-Bashir and his National
Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC). Bashir and the RCC
suspended the 1985 Constitution, abrogated press freedoms, and
disbanded all political parties and trade unions. In 1993 the
RCC dissolved itself and appointed Lt. General Bashir President.
However, since 1989 real power has rested with Hassan Al-Turabi
and his National Islamic Front (NIF). NIF control over government
operations was further solidified with the end of the RCC, and
NIF members and supporters held most key positions in the Government,
security forces, judiciary, academia, and the media. Although
legislative authority theoretically rests with the government-appointed
Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the new Government maintained
the RCC's suspension of the 1985 Constitution and continued to
restrict most civil liberties. In addition to the regular police
and the Sudan People's Armed Forces (SPAF), the Government maintains
an external security organ, an internal security organ, an Islamic
militia, known as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and an Islamic
police force, the Popular Police, whose mission includes enforcing
proper social behavior, including restrictions on alcohol and
"immodest dress." Members of the security forces committed
numerous human rights abuses.
Civil war, economic mismanagement,
over 3 million internally displaced persons, and a refugee influx
from neighboring countries have devastated Sudan's mostly agricultural
economy. Exports of gum arabic, livestock, and meat accounted
for over 50 percent of Sudan's I995 export earnings. Reforms aimed
at privatizing state-run firms and stimulating private investment
failed to revive a moribund economy saddled with massive militaiy
expenditures.
The civil war in Sudan continued
into its l2th year, resulting in the deaths of more than a million
and a half Sudanese. Neither side has the ability to win the war
on the battlefield. The number of human rights violations decreased
in mid-1995 following a limited 4-month cease-fire in the South
brokered by former U. S. President Jimmy Carter and a reduction
in fighting between southern rebel factions prior to the fall
of 1995. However, efforts to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict
by Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea under the auspices of
the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD),
aided by a newly created Dutch-led Friends of IGADD, remained
stalemated.
The dismal human rights situation
showed little improvement. Both the Government and insurgents
committed serious human rights abuses. Government forces carried
out massacres, extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, forced labor,
slavery, and forced conscription, on a broader scale than opposition
forces. A myriad of ofPicial and secret government security forces
routinely harassed, detained, and tortured opponents or suspected
opponents of the Government with impunity. Prison conditions are
harsh, and the judiciary is largely subservient to the Government.
The Government continued to restrict most human rights, including
the rights to free speech, press, assembly, association, religion,
privacy, and movement. Citizens do not have the right or the ability
peacefully to change their government. In the context of the Islamization
and Arabization drive, pressure-including forced Islamization--on
non-Muslims remained strong. Fears of Arabization and Islamization
and the imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) fueled support for
the southern insurgency. Discrimination and violence against women
and abuse of children continued, and government restrictions on
worker rights persisted.
Levels of overall cooperation
with U.N.-sponsored relief operations deteriorated during the
year. Both the SPAF/PDF and rebel factions periodically obstructed
the flow of humanitarian assistance to affected populations, and
there were problems with relief flights in the south.
The rebels continued to restrict
most human rights in the areas under their control and were responsible
for a massacre, extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, and forced
conscription. The Sudanese
People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
did not take action to implement its 1994 decision to create civilian
control over its military and humanitarian wings and to institute
rule of law in areas it controls.
Freedom of Religion
Although the Government has
stated that all religions should be respected and that freedom
of worship is guaranteed, in practice the Government treats Islam
as the de facto state religion and has declared that Islam must
inspire the country's laws, institutions, and policies. Various
restrictions under the Missionary Societies Act of 1962 limited
the ability of non-Muslims to practice their religion freely,
and the 1991 Criminal Act made apostasy by Muslims punishable
by death. In August five Nuban young women were sentenced to death
for apostasy (see Section l.c.). At the end of September, the
police in Port Sudan arrested 10 persons, including 2 women, for
converting to Christianity. These persons were still in detention
at year's end. On November 30, a Catholic priest was detained
while conducting a pastoral visit. At least eight uniformed and
plainclothes security officers took him to four police stations
for questioning about his activities before he was released. He
was not told why he was detained nor were charges brought against
him.
Authorities continued to restrict
the activities of non-Muslims, and there continued to be reports
of harassment and arrest for religious beliefs and activities.
The law forbids proselytizing of Muslims, but Muslims are allowed
to proselytize freely. The Government required missionary groups
to apply for special licenses and continued to deny or delay work
permits for foreign missionaries. In April longtime resident and
Catholic missionary Father Ottorino Sina was denied a reentry
visa to return to Sudan; three other religious leaders were threatened
with expulsion.
The Government continued to
deny permission to build churches, and in the north no new churches
have been built since the early 1970"s. Reliable reports
stated that in some war zones, government forces closed or burned
churches and mosques and restricted movements of Christian clergy.
At the local level, NIF officials restricted normal activities
of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Sudan Council of
Churches, and the Coptic Church. In October 1994, the Government
replaced the controversial Missionary Act with the Societies Registration
Act. Although this act allows churches to engage in a wider range
of activities than the Missionary Act, churches are subject to
the restrictions placed on non religious corporations. Non-Muslims
continued to criticize privately the Government's favoritism of
Islam over other religions. Only Muslims are allowed to adopt
children (see Section l.f.). As the basis of Sudan's Arab culture,
all citizens are exposed to Islamic ideas set forth in the Koran.
All Popular Defense Force trainees, including non-Muslims, are
indoctrinated in the Islamic faith. In prisons, government supported
Islamic NGO's offer inducements to, and exert pressure on, non-Muslim
inmates to convert. Reliable reports stated that, in some war
zones, Islamic NGO's withheld food and other key services from
the needy unless they converted to Islam.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur
in his 1995 Interim Report to the U.N. General Assembly reported
that in rebel-controlled areas, Christians, Muslims, and followers
of traditional African faiths were generally allowed to worship
freely.
